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Jury Source Lists and the Community's Need to
Achieve Racial Balance on the Jury
Stephanie Domitrovich*
INTRODUCTION
Jurors read, analyze and interpret trial evidence and testimo-
ny through the language of their life experiences, knowledge and
perception of cases. Jurors hear and see various versions of
stories in the courtroom from witnesses, litigants and lawyers.
These jurors, while maintaining their individuality, together
engage in the language of the decision-making process called
deliberation. During deliberations, they voice their recall of
testimony and they explore the credibility of witnesses and evi-
dence. They reconstruct the story of the evidence. As one body -
the jury - they unite their common experiences, knowledge and
perceptions to arrive at their verdict. The process of voir dire
purports to discover if this common language includes any biases
or prejudices.' Those who participate in voir dire are selected
from jury source lists, such as lists for registered voters and
licensed drivers. Hence, jury source lists are created to form the
jury pool for voir dire purposes.
The community perceives the jury selection process to be fair
when its members can participate fully in voir dire. Whether full
participation is possible, however, is largely based on the foun-
* B.A. Carlow College, J.D. Duquesne University School of Law, Master's
Degree in Judicial Studies from the University of Nevada in conjunction with the
National Judicial College. The author was elected in November, 1989, Judge in the
Court of Common Pleas of the Sixth Judicial District of Pennsylvania, located in
Erie County.
This article was derived in part from a thesis submitted in partial fulfill-
ment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Judicial Studies at the Univer-
sity of Nevada at Reno.
1. Experts recommend that attorneys research the trial's locale for that par-
ticular community's nuances rather than relying upon information derived from na-
tional surveys. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Social Scientists Can't Rig Juries, in IN
TH JURY Box 48, 51 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman et al. eds., 1987).
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dation of voir dire - jury source lists and random selection.
This article focuses on the community's perception of the lack of
minority participation on jury panels and offers solutions to
alter and improve this perception by including more minorities
on jury source lists and modifying random selection. This article
examines the importance of the perception of fairness in the
judicial system, discusses the development of the concept of an
impartial and cross-representative jury and the current status of
case law, and reviews the composition of source lists and solu-
tions to the problem of minority underrepresentation. This arti-
cle then recommends tools for increasing minority participation
on jury pools.
A Background on Jury Selection
Experts recognize that practices involved in the jury selection
process are often controversial.2 Trial lawyers have historically
selected jurors under the premise that the ethnic background of
jurors can affect decision-making' Clarence Darrow, for exam-
ple, believed that Irish and Italian jurors were pro-defense, and
that Scottish, Scandinavian, and German jurors were pro-plain-
tiff, and typically favored the Commonwealth.4
Although biases are recognized, our judicial system is not
designed to exclude all biases. Some biases, such as the pre-
sumption that a defendant is innocent, are actually encouraged.
In addition, juries are selected from the locale where the offense
was committed so that the jury will act as the "conscience of the
community."' Juries also apply current social attitudes to each
case.' Its perception of social attitudes and of the community's
conscience is affected by its experience in society.7 These desir-
2. See, e.g., Section II, The Biased Juror, in IN THE JURY Box 81 (Lawrence
S. Wrightman et al. eds., 1987). In the jury selection process, questions arise as to
whether attorneys should be permitted to ask questions regarding a potential juror's
religious or political beliefs, their likes and dislikes and their family history. Id.
Questions arise as to whether the court or counsel should conduct voir dire and
whether jurors should be questioned individually in a private forum or collectively in
a public forum. Id. The editors also note that the process of selecting a group of
citizens to represent the community is based upon the premise that some potential
jurors are too biased to make an impartial determination. Id.
3. Section II, The Biased Juror, in IN THE JURY Box, cited at note 2, at 81.
4. Id. (citing SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 492 (7th
ed. 1966)).
5. Martin F. Kaplan & Lynn E. Miller, Reducing The Effects of Juror Bias,
in IN THE JURY Box 114, 135 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman et al. eds., 1987) (citing W.
N. Brooks & A. N. Doob, Justice and the Jury, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 171-82 (1975)).
6. Kaplan, cited at note 5, at 135.
7. Id
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able biases are therefore encouraged, and the system must select
individuals with optimal biases and exclude those with undesir-
able biases.8
In the process of excluding jurors with undesirable biases, the
requirement that a fair and representative cross-section of the
community sit in judgment cannot be sacrificed. Selecting jurors
from a pool of candidates with diverse backgrounds furthers the
goal of obtaining an impartial jury for the defendant, because a
diverse jury will represent the experiences and perceptions of
the community.
Consistent with the notion that a jury should be impartial,
legislators and members of the judiciary have devised a jury
selection system devoid of initial reference to gender, race or
ethnic background - random selection. As a term, random se-
lection has its roots in mathematical statistics; however, the
judiciary has been careful to point out that random jury selec-
tion does not equate to the same mathematical certainty.9 Ran-
dom selection is objective in that each name ideally has the
same probability of selection."0 A randomly selected list there-
fore represents potential impartial jurors whose gender or race
are unknown. While the selection from this list may indeed be
random, the likelihood of selecting a jury that represents a fair
cross-section of the community is contingent on the composition
of the source list.
Clearly, without a sufficient source list, random selection is a
hurdle to obtaining a fully representative jury. A perfectly repre-
sentative and inclusive source list would contain the name of
every individual from the eligible population. However, even if
the list is perfectly inclusive, it remains statistically impossible
8. Id. This balancing approach to biases is illustrated in standard criminal
jury instructions, which explain to jurors their role as fact-finders. See PA. SUGGEST-
ED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7.05(3) (1979). Section 7.05(3) states:
However, in deciding the facts, you may properly apply common sense and
draw upon your own everyday, practical knowledge of life as each of you has
experienced it. You should keep your deliberations free of any bias or prejudice.
Both the Commonwealth and the defendant have a right to expect you to
consider the evidence conscientiously and to apply the law as I have outlined
it to you.
Id. (emphasis added). While the court recognizes that jurors rely on their life experi-
ences in reaching decisions, the courts specifically instruct jurors to be impartial and
to avoid bias or prejudice in arriving at their verdict. Id.
9. Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Implementation of Jury Standards,
Illinois Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management, Final Draft 3 (June 5,
1989) (on file with the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts) (recognizing that
source lists consisting of 100% of the population will be impossible, and suggesting
85% as a reasonable goal).
10. Illinois Supreme Court Committee, cited at note 9, at 4.
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to prove that those jurors selected from the list represent all of
the community's attitudes and experiences. Nevertheless, a list
that is inclusive increases the likelihood that the jurors selected
will represent a cross-section of the community.
Random selection should produce juries that are both repre-
sentative and inclusive, if the source list itself is representative
and inclusive." While many jurisdictions rely exclusively on
voter registration lists as the source for potential jurors, these
lists are neither inclusive nor representative because they re-
duce minority participation at a critical stage of the jury pro-
cess." Census data indicate that a substantially higher per-
centage of middle-class Caucasians register to vote than do mi-
norities or the poor, and the rate of voter registration is highest
among middle-class Caucasians." Voter registration rates make
clear that exclusive use of voter registration lists as source lists
results in disparity between the composition of the community
and the composition of the jury. Therefore, jurisdictions that rely
primarily upon voter registration lists to develop source lists
effectively exclude a significant number of minorities even before
the selection process begins. 4
To increase minority participation, minority leaders must
raise the community's consciousness. 5 The leaders must urge
the community members to get on jury source lists and serve on
the jury if chosen through the voir dire process. Trial judges
should also stress the importance of the role of the juror to com-
munity members, especially minorities. Judges should stress the
importance of removing all impediments to jury service, such as
employment difficulties, so that minority jurors in particular can
be panelists in the voir dire stage.16
11. The Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Implementation of Jury Stan-
dards addressed this concept when it noted:
[Clonsider a county in which the source list includes 900 of the 1,000 eligible
adults in the population. Further suppose that the list was constructed in
such a way that only 50 of the 100 blacks in the population were included in
the source list. Even though this hypothetical source list is 90% inclusive, it is
nonetheless extremely underrepresentative with respect to race.
Id.
12. Developments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L.
RKV. 1472, 1562 (1988).
13. Developments in the Law, cited at note 12, at 1562.
14. Id. at 1562-63.
15. One commentator asserts that legal reform advocating race and gender
neutrality is not the solution for minorities. See Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Re-
form, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1336 (1988). Crenshaw believes that the African-American
community's most valuable political asset is its "ability to assert a collective identity
and to name its collective political reality." Id.
16. For example, a minority juror in Texas recently indicated to a trial judge
Vol. 33:39
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While some members of the judiciary and the public have
recognized that the lack of minorities on jury panels is a prob-
lem, other members of the judiciary remain divided on the issue.
Some judges believe that it is not an issue in their community,
while others realize that, even if it seems to be a non-issue in
their jurisdictions, the absence of minorities on jury pools gener-
ally, is a potential problem. Other judges believe that following
constitutional mandates is sufficient, regardless of the public's
perception. The following section of this article addresses the
importance of the public's perception of the jury selection pro-
cess.
IMPORTANCE OF THE PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION OF JURIES
We need to increase minority participation because the value
of juries to our system of justice cannot be underestimated. Ju-
ries channel community values. 7 Juries also provide "a check
on the possible excesses of the legislative branch.""8 Juries pro-
tect and insulate litigants from a biased or corrupt lone decision
maker."9
A recent poll revealed that jurors perceived racial bias or
imbalance in the justice system.20 The poll asked jurors wheth-
er they thought minority defendants - including African-Ameri-
cans, Hispanics and Asians - were less likely to receive a fair
that she needed to be excused because she was a chief administrative nurse "on
call" for a local hospital. Telephone Interview with Olin Underwood, trial court judge
of Conroe, Texas (January, 1993). The trial judge explained the importance of her
service to the public, particularly in light of the King case. Id. This talk encouraged
her to find a substitute at her place of employment so that she could serve as a
juror. Id. In the King case, the defendants, Caucasian police officers were acquitted
of physically assaulting an African-American man, Rodney King. After the jury ac-
quitted the police officers, riots erupted in Los Angeles. See Racial Divide Affects
Black, White Panelists, NATL L.J. 58, February 22, 1993 [hereinafter Racial Divide].
17. ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A
CASE STUDY 3 (1984).
18. AUSTIN, cited at note 17, at 3.
19. Id. Studies, however, have concluded that less than ten percent of the
variations in group decisions are attributable to factors such as personality and
attitudes. Small-Group Decision Making and Complex Information Tasks 39 (1981)
(report to the Federal Judicial Center). Hence, according to these statistics, jury
composition may not actually have a strong impact on the decision. Regardless of
the actual impact however, it is the community's perception of the impact on the
decision-making process that is important.
20. Racial Divide, cited at note 16. Nearly 800 people who served on civil and
criminal juries throughout the country participated in the polling. A Profile of Those
in the Poll, NAT'L. L. J., Feb. 22, 1993, at S6. The composition of the group was
approximately 84% White, 12% Black, 1% Hispanic, 1% Native American, and less
than 1% Asian jurors. Id.
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trial than a Caucasian defendant.21 A greater percentage of Af-
rican-American jurors believed that minorities would not receive
as fair a trial as Caucasian defendants.'
The group's responses did not surprise the poll-takers, who
noted that "the racial divide, which remains an indisputable fact
of everyday life in America, also manifests itself in the nation's
system of justice."' The poll results indicated that African-
Americans believe that the criminal justice system favors Cauca-
sians in dispensing justice, as evidenced by the L.A. riots.'
The jury, through its verdict, can have both a positive and
negative impact upon the community. The nation witnessed the
negative impact of the jurors' verdict in the Rodney King assault
case when the Los Angeles community erupted with violence
and looting as word of the verdict spread. However, this same
verdict has had a positive impact on communities throughout
the United States because it raised the level of consciousness
concerning racial disparity in jury selection and participation.'
The verdict "shook up jurors' perceptions of the judicial sys-
tem." 6 It "woke jurors out of a coma. . . [of] believing that law
enforcement is always right."
27
21. Racial Divide, cited at note 16.
22. Id. The poll-takers stated:
Blacks are convinced that they are executed in disproportionate numbers, and
six out of 10 said that white civil plaintiffs get a fairer hearing than blacks.
More than two-thirds of black jurors agreed that white plaintiffs are awarded
more money for injuries than injured black, Hispanic or Asian plaintiffs. Only
25 percent of white jurors agreed that white plaintiffs are better compensated.
Sixty-seven percent of black jurors said they think that minority defen-
dant - including blacks, Hispanics and Asians - in criminal cases get a
less fair trial than their white counterparts. Only 33 percent of white jurors
think minority defendants are unfairly treated in the system.
Id. at S8.
23. Id.
24. Id. Public response to the poll results, however, was mixed:
"If you were caught in a foreign country and you're a Martian and you're
being put to trial, and there's no Martian on the jury, no Martian judges and
no Martian attorneys, it raises the likelihood that the Martian is not going to
get a fair shake. That's how minorities see it," said Mr. Castillo, a Hispanic
partner at Chicago's Kirkland & Ellis.
Black attorney Donald Hubert of Chicago's Donald Hubert & Associates
said the jurors' attitudes toward race "scared" him. "Take all the questions of
fairness, they blow my mind .... It's real apparent that blacks and whites
have different attitudes on the fundamentals of fairness."
Id.
25. Id. at S9.
26. Racial Divide, cited at note 16, at S9.
27. Id. Sixty-one percent of all jurors interviewed believed that the police of-
ficers were guilty; only nine percent voted for an acquittal; twenty-nine percent of.
fered no opinion. id. at S8-89. When the statistics were separated by race, fifty-eight
percent of white jurors would have convicted the police officers, contrasted with
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Indeed, although jurors and many other individuals in our
communities have faith in the jury system, some jurors and com-
munities believe there is room for improvement, especially in the
area of minority representation on juries. Perceptions of racial
bias in the justice system can arise from the racial imbalance
that is self-evident in communities where not even one minority
juror is available for jury selection. The voir dire challenge re-
quirements of Batson v. Kentucky' do not remedy such a situa-
tion.
In Batson, the prosecutor employed four peremptory challeng-
es to strike the only four African-Americans on the venire panel;
the defendant was also African-American.29 The Supreme Court
ruled that the Equal Protection Clause forbade prosecutors from
excluding African-Americans on the basis of race or upon any
assumption that African-American jurors as a group would be
biased in favor of a defendant of the same race. 0 The Court
held that a defendant in a criminal case could establish a prima
facie equal protection violation based solely on the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges."1 The Court concluded that once
the defendant made this prima facie showing, the prosecutor
had to provide a racially neutral reason for the exclusion of Afri-
can-Americans.32
While Batson provides some assurances that minorities on the
venire will not be summarily excluded from the jury, Batson
does not address the composition of the jury pool. The source list
for the master list of jurors creates the difficulty, for the source
list is the basis of the jury pool. Jury pools are divided into pan-
els or venires, and it is from a venire that a Batson challenge
can be taken. The heart of the jury selection process is the list of
names compiled to make available prospective cross-representa-
tive jurors for venires - a "pre-Batson" or "foundation-for-
Batson" stage. Batson does not apply if there are no minorities
to be challenged on the venire.
Trial judges who have had the opportunity to talk with jurors
after they have rendered their verdicts are frequently faced with
eighty-nine percent of black jurors. Id. Michael Stone, attorney for one of the Los
Angeles police officers, was perplexed by these responses. He asserted that the re-
sponses were contradictory because although the jurors expressed faith in the jury
system, they believed this decision was "off base." Id.
28. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
29. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 96. The defendant did not need evidence of instances of discrimina-
tory misconduct from prior cases. Id.
32. Id. at 97.
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the popular question of why not even one black juror was called
for service in an African-American defendant's trial. The issue of
minority representation on juries is presently being addressed
by state legislatures and community action groups. In Pennsyl-
vania, the General Assembly has proposed legislation to require
minimum minority composition of venires where a defendant is
a minority."3 Public forums have been held in communities
such as Erie, Pennsylvania, where a non-profit organization
known as Citizens Against Racism is searching for solutions.'
Other communities are grappling with the same issue and
experimenting with more inclusive source lists for the benefit of
minority defendants, thereby improving the community's percep-
tion of the jury process. Citizens' concerns stem from their fear
that what occurred in Los Angeles could happen in their commu-
nities. This concern substantiates the urgent need to increase
minority participation on juries.
In order to understand the significance of minority participa-
tion on juries, one must first understand the importance of the
jury itself in our democratic system. The next section of this
article discusses the development of the modem jury system.
"HERE COMES THE JU[RY'- AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
The ancient Greeks are often credited with creating the jury
circa 400 B.C."6 This jury of the accused peers was to judge the
accused according to their understanding of justice, rather than
by applying the specific law.3 Jurors were randomly chosen
from a list of qualified males over the age of thirty. 7
Other historians, however, claim that the concept of a "jury of
one's peers" originated in 1215 A.D. as a check on the king by
the barons at Runnymede.' The juror requirement meant that
33. See H.R. 1182, 177th Gen. Assem., 1993 Reg. Seas. (1993). See notes 438-
44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposed legislation.
34. A local newspaper article reported on an Erie town-meeting:
A panel of prominent citizens quarreled sometimes among themselves and
sometimes with their audience about how best to achieve racially fair juries in
Erie County.
They agreed on two things: a perception exists that all-white juries
make it impossible for minorities to get a fair trial and that this perception,
accurate or not, is as dangerous as the reality.
Bill McKinney, Representation: Should Juries Have More Blacks?, ERIE MORNING
NEWS, January 13, 1993, at C1.
35. See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 2 (1988).
36. GUINTHER, cited at note 35, at 2.
37. Id.
38. Dorothy Kenyon & Pauli Murray, The Case for Equality in State Jury
Service 18 (May 1, 1966) (on file with the author).
Vol. 33:39
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the peers of the barons, other barons, served as jurors." In this
context, a "jury of one's peers" certainly did not connote a set of
jurors drawn from the diverse background and heritage of the
general populace.
The 11th century English practice of having neighbors of the
defendant come into court and provide answers based on their
personal knowledge, has also been viewed as the foundation of
the jury system.4" Until the end of the 15th century, these ju-
rors would serve a dual role as witnesses and factfinders.4'
Over the next several hundred years, the jury's role as an inde-
pendent body was solidified.42
The jury has evolved into the cornerstone of impartial justice.
The jury's power and influence triumphed over those in govern-
ment who used their official powers to abuse their office by
wrongfully charging individuals. An example of this abuse is
illustrated by the famous 1670 trial of William Penn and the co-
defendant Mead, and its associated action, Bushel's Case.' The
officials who leveled the charges against Penn and Mead hoped
that the jury would convict the defendants and thereby hurt the
images of both the Quakers and the King." The jury, however,
failed to reach unanimity and was sent back several times to
reconsider its verdict.' When the jury found Penn guilty only
of speaking in the street, the judge became irate.' The jurors
were told:
Gentlemen, you shall not be dismissed, till we have a verdict that the
court will accept; and you shall be locked up, without meat, drink, fire
and tobacco; You shall not... thus... abuse the court, we will have a
verdict by the help of God, or you shall starve for it."
The jury refused to be swayed by the judge and came back
with a verdict of not guilty for William Penn.' With this ver-
39. Kenyon, cited at note 38, at 18.
40. RITA SIMON, THE JuRY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 5 (1980).
41. SIMON, cited at note 40, at 5.
42. Id. Historians have suggested that insuring the maintenance of the jury's
role was one of the primary functions of the English Declaration and Bill of Rights.
Id.
43. For an in depth discussion of Bushel's Case, see GuINTHER, cited at note
35, at 24-26.
44. GUINTHER, cited at note 35, at 25. Unidentified charges against Penn were
allegedly derived from common law. Id. When the court refused to answer Penn's
request to know which common law, Penn quipped, "if the common law [is] so hard
to underst[and], it's far from being very common." Id.
45. Id. at 26.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 27.
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dict, the judge relented and no longer tried to force the jury to
find Penn guilty.4 However, "the judge turned to the jurors and
fined them 40 marks each, and when they refused to pay, they
too were sent off to Newgate Prison."0 Eventually, eight of the
twelve jurors paid their fines to be released; however, four re-
fused to pay the fines and remained in prison until they were
granted bail.51 After nearly a year, the reviewing court conclud-
ed that they had been illegally jailed.5" The chief justice of the
court asserted that a jury could not be punished for its verdict.
Years later, the historian, Alexis de Tocqueville, compared
English and American jury selection processes. He found that al-
though England favored selecting jurors from its aristocracy,
America did not make a class distinction.5' Tocqueville believed
the power and role of the jury to be "the most energetic means of
making the people rule" and "the most efficacious means of
teaching [the people] how to rule well.""5
49. GUINTHER, cited at note 35, at 27. Sir Samuel, the judge in Penn's case,
knew that the Quakers would not bare their heads for any temporal authority. Id.
at 25. Seeking to damage the image of the Quakers, he ordered hats to be placed
on Penn and Mead and then fined them for refusing to remove the hats in court.
Id. When Penn asked for his release after the jury's verdict of not guilty, the judge
committed Penn to jail, charging him with contempt of court for failing to pay the
fines. Id.
50. Id. at 27.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The lead juror in this cause was Bushel - hence the reference to
Bushel's Case. Id. Guinther notes that:
Bushel and his colleagues - men otherwise anonymous but distinguished in the
history of freedom - had made it possible for all juries that came after them
to render their verdicts without fear and as they, not the judge, saw the equi-
ties. The jury of one's peers that the barons had provided had at last become
what the barons never wanted it to be, a democratic parliament of 12.
Id.
54. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 283 (Francis Bowen,
trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1976) (1835). Tocqueville asserted:
The jury system as it is understood in America appears to me to be as direct
and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal
suffrage .... All the sovereigns who have chosen to govern by their own
authority, and to direct society instead of obeying its directions, have de-
stroyed or enfeebled the institution of the jury.
Id.
55. TOCQUEVILLE, cited at note 54 at 287. Tocqueville explained:
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the spirit
of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits
which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free institutions. It imbues all
classes with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion of right. If
these two elements be removed, the love of independence becomes a mere
destructive passion. It teaches men to practice equity; every man learns to
judge his neighbor as he would himself be judged .... The jury teaches
every man not to recoil before the responsibility of his own actions .... it
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The nature of the jury in America as a guard against oppres-
sion changed after the Civil War.' While northern juries were
not likely to convict persons charged with violating the federal
Fugitive Slave Law, Post-Civil War juries in reconstructed South-
ern states consistently ruled against African-Americans and in
favor of Caucasians. 7 These instances demonstrate that a bi-
ased jury may subvert the law, and that a non-inclusive jury
system is prone to have biases. Fortunately, our concept of juries
has broadened and developed to include all citizens of our nation.
The courts have worked to achieve this through random selec-
tion.
RANDOM SELECTION AND INTERFERENCE WITH RANDOM
SELECTION
The Fair Cross-section Requirement
The democratic overhaul of the jury began with the Supreme
Court's decision in Glasser v. United States." Justice Murphy,
writing for the majority, warned in Glasser that the use of any
method of juror selection other than one which provided a repre-
sentative group would negate the effectiveness of a jury trial and
should be avoided.59 The following words of Justice Murphy are
prophetic and unforgettable:
That the motives influencing such tendencies may be of the best must
not blind us to the dangers of allowing any encroachment whatsoever on
this essential right. Steps innocently taken may, one by one, lead to the
irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties.'
Four years later, in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,"' Justice
Murphy defined the concept of a "cross-section of the community"
makes them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards
society and the part which they take in its government.
Id. at 284-85.
56. SIMON, cited at note 40, at 7.
57. Id.
58. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
59. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 86.
60. Id. Justice Murphy also cited Blackstone, who commented on the power of
the jury, stating:
Since it was first recognized in Magna Carta, trial by jury has been a prized
shield against oppression, but, while proclaiming trial by jury as "the glory of
the English law," Blackstone was careful to note that it was but a "privi-
lege." . . . Our Constitution transforms that privilege into a right in criminal
proceedings in a federal court.
Id. at 84 (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379).
61. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
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to include persons in every stratum of society.' According to
Justice Murphy, jurors should be selected from every racial, polit-
ical, religious or social group." He recognized jury competence
as an individual matter rather than as a group or class mat-
ter.'
In Thiel, qualified individuals had been excluded from the jury
list.' The clerk of the district court and the jury commissioner
customarily excluded ironworkers, bricklayers, carpenters, ma-
chinists, and other mechanics and laborers because these persons
earned wages as high as ten dollars a day and could not afford to
sit as jurors for the nominal rate of four dollars a day.66 In re-
jecting the systematic exclusions, the Supreme Court asserted
that juries must maintain a broad representative character to
assure diffused impartiality and to share in the civic responsibili-
ty to administer justice.6 7
In Thiel, the Supreme Court did not require "that every jury
must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious,
racial, political and geographical groups of the community.'
The Court recognized that complete representation would be
impossible."9 The Court did mandate, however, that jurors must
be "selected by court officials without systematic and intentional
exclusion of any ... groups."7" The Court reasoned that if basic
democratic principles were disregarded, the door opened to class
distinctions and discriminations.7'
In Swain v. Alabama,7 2 the jury commissioners had selected
individuals for jury rolls from sources including city directories,
registration lists, club and church lists, and word of mouth.73
Evidence of underrepresentation included the following:
While Negro males over 21 constitute 26% of all males in the county in
62. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 219.
66. Id. at 222.




71. Id. Statutory provisions should guide a court's discretion in choosing meth-
ods to avoid unlawful classifications and discrimination. Id. at 220-21. In Thiel, the
Court rejected the systematic exclusion of daily wage-earners from the jury list, even
though the jury panel contained at least five members of the laboring class. Id. at
225.
72. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part by, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).
73. Swain, 380 U.S. at 207-08 n.4.
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this age group, only 10 to 15% of the grand and petit jury panels drawn
from the jury box since 1953 have been Negroes, there having been only
one case in which the percentage was as high as 23%."'
The Swain Court refused to conclude that purposeful discrimina-
tion existed based solely on an identifiable group in a community
being underrepresented by ten percent.75 The Court also noted
that a defendant was not entitled to a jury roll or a venire which
was "a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect[s]
the proportionate strength of every identifiable group."76 Al-
though the Court observed that the selection process was "hap-
hazard[ly]" done and with "little effort... made to ensure that
all groups in the community were fully represented," the Court
held that such a system, although imperfect, did not result in
purposeful discrimination based on race.7
Expanding Thiel, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana,'
held that the fair cross-section requirement was violated by a
state provision excluding women from jury service unless they
requested in writing to serve.79 This provision excluded from
jury service 53% of the potentially eligible citizens., ° The court
noted that a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the communi-
ty was a necessary component of the Sixth Amendment's guaran-
tee of a jury trial."' The Court determined that as a group, wom-
en were sufficiently numerous and distinct from men. 2 Thus,
the systematic exclusion of a numerous and distinct class vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment's mandate that the jury be comprised
of a fair cross-section of the community. 3
74. Id. at 205.
75. Id. at 208-09.
76. Id. at 208.
77. Id. at 209.
78. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
79. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31. The Louisiana code provided that, "[a] woman
shall not be selected for jury service unless she has previously filed with the clerk
of court of the parish in which she resides a written declaration of her desire to be
subject to jury service." Id. at 523 n.2 (quoting LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc., Art. 402).
80. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531.
81. Id. at 530. The Sixth Amendment provides, in part, that, "[in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In interpreting the Sixth Amendment provision, the Taylor court emphasized
that, "[tihe purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power - to
make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the
overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
overconditioned or biased response of a judge." Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (citing
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968)).
82. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531.
83. Id.
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In the seminal case of Duren v. Missouri," the Supreme
Court set forth the standards for determining whether the jury
selection process complied with the fair cross-section require-
ment. In Duren, the Court applied its holding in Taylor to a Mis-
souri statute which granted women an automatic exemption from
jury service." The Court held that this statute was unconstitu-
tional because it failed to satisfy the fair cross-section require-
ment." The Court asserted that if a defendant could establish
underrepresentation of a cognizable group resulting from system-
atic exclusion, the defendant had established a prima facie viola-
tion. 7
After noting that the Court had previously determined in
Taylor that women were a cognizable group, the Duren Court
determined that the defendant had adequately demonstrated
underrepresentation." With regard to systematic exclusion, the
Court asserted that "a large discrepancy occurred not just occa-
sionally, but in every weekly venire for a period of nearly a year
manifestly indicates that the cause of the underrepresentation
was systematic - that is inherent in the particular jury selection
process utilized."" Finally, the Court concluded that the state
had failed to demonstrate a significant interest in systematically
excluding women from the jury selection process."
The importance of a representative jury, particularly in a capi-
tal case, was illustrated in Davis v. Zant.5' In Davis, the court
recognized the importance of a trial by a representative jury of
the defendant's peers in a capital case, because the jury must
consider mitigating factors, such as the defendant's character,
prior record and any circumstances purported by the defendant
to lead to a sentence less than death.92 The undisputed evidence
84. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
85. Duren, 439 U.S. at 357. While women represented more than 50% of the
population, they comprised less than 15% of the jury pool. Id. at 366.
86. Id. at 370.
87. Id. at 364. The Court required a defendant to show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the com-
munity; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries
are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such per-
sons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to sys-
tematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.
Id.
88. id. at 364. The defendant presented census figures indicating that women
constituted 54% of the community; however, 85% of the prospective jurors were
male. Id. at 364-66.
89. Id. at 366.
90. Duren, 439 U.S. at 369.
91. 721 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 (1985).
92. Davis, 721 F.2d at 1482.
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indicated that there was an 18.4% disparity between the percent-
age of women in Troup County and the percentage of women on
the jury list, and an 18.1% disparity between the percentage of
African-Americans in the county population and those on the jury
list.9" The Georgia state legislature had enacted a statute which
the Eleventh Circuit found did not utilize a random selection
method."4 While applauding the state legislature for devising a
procedure in keeping with decisions of the Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the statute contained the "possibility
of abuse" because it authorized jury commissioners to use their
subjective judgment in supplementing the jury lists "by going out
into the county and personally acquainting themselves with other
citizens of the county, including intelligent and upright citizens
of any significantly identifiable group in the county which may
not be fairly represented on the jury list."95
Six of the eight jury commissioners testified that they knew
only to utilize the voter registration lists and were not aware
that they were required to supplement the voter registration list
if necessary to achieve a representative pool.' While four of the
commissioners testified that they used a random selection pro-
cess,97 the court found that "a significant proportion of the 4,015
names on the list were selected through subjective means.""8
Several other commissioners recognized the race and gender of
names on the registered voter's list, causing the selection criteria
not to be "facially neutral."99 The selection of every sixth name
only accounted for 2,800 of the names chosen, and the jury com-
missioners were unable to explain how the remaining 1,215
names were derived." The Davis court concluded that the jury
selection procedure was "easily capable of being manipulated" to
create disparities between the percentage of women and African-
93. Id. at 1481 n.3.
94. Id. at 1483.
95. Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 91-106). The current version of the statute is
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-40 (1994).
96. Davis, 721 F.2d at 1484.
97. Id. The four commissioners who used a random selection process testified
that they chose every fifth name or every sixth name from the voter registration
list. Id.
98. Id. The court cited specific instances in support of its factual conclusion.
For example, one commissioner hand-selected 700 of the 4,015 total by "choosing
persons that 'we knew or thought would make a good juror.' " Id. Another commis-
sioner claimed to use the every-sixth-name method, but closer inspection indicated
that a number of consecutive names were selected, contradicting his initial position.
Id. At one point sixteen consecutive names were chosen. Id. The commissioner then
conceded that a random method had not been utilized. Id.
99. Id. at 1485.
100. Id.
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Americans in the county and in the jury pool.1"' The court held
that the petitioner had established a prima facie case that the
jury selection process was unconstitutional and that the state
had failed to provide adequate rebuttal evidence.'02
The New York Court of Appeals decision in People v.
Guzman,"3 discussed the different analyses applied to claims
asserting due process violations and equal protection violations in
jury pooling. In Guzman, an African-American defendant con-
tended that the jury pool underrepresented Hispanics.'" The
court cited Supreme Court precedent holding that, if a defendant
could prove exclusion of another race from jury service, then the
defendant had established a violation of due process. 16 The
court noted that prior case law established that a jury pool that
represented a cross-section of the community was required to
ensure that all defendants, not only a defendant of a particular
excluded race, received due process."0 6
To establish a prima facie case of exclusion, a defendant must
show that a substantial and identifiable segment of the commu-
nity was systematically excluded from service."0 7 Once the de-
fendant has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the state to prove that a fair cross-section is incompatible with a
significant state interest.' 8 The court in Guzman indicated
that, although the defendant established that Hispanics were a
substantial and distinct group, and that Hispanics were not rea-
sonably represented in the pool in light of the number of Hispan-
ics in the community, the defendant had failed to establish sys-
tematic exclusion.' 9
Guzman focused on the mailing of subpoenas to Hispanics in
direct proportion to the percentage of Hispanics in the popula-
tion. The court noted that the response procedure for Hispan-
ics was the same as for other groups, in that all of those respond-
101. Davis, 721 F.2d at 1485. The court determined that the disparity between
the percentage of women in the county and women on the jury list was 18.4%, and
the disparity between the percentage of African-American in the county and African-
Americans on the jury list was 18.1%. Id.
102. Id. The court explained that an assertion that the commissioners acted in
good faith was an insufficient rebuttal. Id.
103. 457 N.E.2d 1143 (N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
104. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d at 1145.
105. Id. at 1146 (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) and Duren v. Mis-
souri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)).
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ing to the summons were interviewed by the commissioner.'i'
The Guzman court focused on the fact that because the jury se-
lection system was not responsible for Hispanics responding in
lower percentages, the process was not inherently defective.'
In considering the equal protection issue, the court in Guzman
noted that the defendant had established Hispanics were an
"underrepresented group" and a "recognizable, distinct class" that
received different treatment under the law."' However, the
court concluded that the other requirement for an equal protec-
tion violation, discriminatory intent, was not established."" The
state was successful in proving that there was no discriminatory
intent on the face of the selection and response procedure, even
though Hispanics responded at a disproportionately lower rate
than non-Hispanics to qualification summonses."' The court
observed that, according to the statistics, nearly twenty-five per-
cent of the responding Hispanics were disqualified for failing to
sufficiently complete the questionnaire."' In addition, some
wbmen with young children were exempted by their own re-
quest." '7 This left approximately seventy-five percent of the
responding Hispanics to be added to the pool."
8
In determining that there was no equal protection violation,
the Guzman court opined that the low response rate led to the
underrepresentation of Hispanics, and that there was no discrim-
inatory intent in the process itself."9 The court concluded that
the Hispanics caused the underrepresentation by failing to re-
spond at all, failing to respond adequately, and by requesting
exemptions. 2' According to the court, the selection system itself
was "racially neutral" and not intentionally discriminatory."'
Ill. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d at 1147. Guzman failed to indicate whether other
ethnic or racial groups were summoned in a number which was proportionate to the
community population.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1148.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1148-49.
116. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d at 1149. The commissioner attributed the failure to
complete the questionnaires to lack of proficiency in speaking, reading, writing and
understanding the English language, and on that basis disqualified those returning
incomplete questionnaires. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Non-Hispanic representation was nearly three times greater than His-
panic representation in the pool. Id.
119. Id. at 1148-49.
120. Id. at 1149.
121. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d at 1149.
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Use of Voter Registration Lists as Source Lists
A number of courts have addressed the validity of using voter
registration lists as source lists. The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals addressed this issue in United States v. Lewis.'22 In Lew-
is, the defendant alleged that because many African-Americans
did not register to vote, the use of a voter registration list as the
only source of potential jurors failed to provide a fair cross-sec-
tion of the community and thus, effectively excluded African-
Americans from jury service. 2 ' The defendant argued that the
court should use a multiple-source list composed of Social Secu-
rity rolls, Public Assistance rolls, and census information. 24 In
order to prevail, the defendant had to prove that African-Ameri-
cans who chose not to register to vote were a "cognizable group"
and were "systematically excluded."'25 The court held that peo-
ple who chose not to vote did not constitute a "cognizable group"
because their non-registration "was a result of their own inaction;
not a result of affirmative conduct by others to bar their registra-
tion."12s
The court recognized that although a "fairer cross-section of the
community may have been produced by the use of 'other sources
of names,' " sole reliance on voter registration lists was constitu-
tionally permissible." The principal source list for random se-
lection was determined by Congress to be either "voter registra-
tion lists or the lists of actual voters" in addition to some other
source or sources of names "where necessary to foster the policy
and protect the rights secured by Sections 1861 and 1862."128
122. 472 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1973).




127. id. According to the court in Lewis:
The defendant had the right to a jury "selected at random from a fair cross
section of the community." However, he had no right to be tried by a particu-
lar jury which was itself "a fair cross section of the community"; nor did he
have a right to a jury selected at random from the fairest cross section of the
community.
Id. at 255.
128. Lewis, 472 F.2d at 255 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2)) (alteration in orig-
inal). Section 1863(b)(2) reads in part:
§ 1863. Plan for random jury selection.
(b) Among other things, such plan shall-
(2) specify whether the names of prospective jurors shall be select-
ed from the voter registration lists or the lists of actual voters of
the political subdivisions within the district or division. The plan
shall prescribe some other source or sources of names in addition
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Therefore, the court deferred to the legislature's discretion to
determine the principal source list.2 '
In United States v. Davenport,"0 the defendant argued that
the registered voter source list should be supplemented with
other lists prescribed by law to expand minority representation in
the jury pool.' To obtain evidence for his argument of minority
underrepresentation, the defendant requested to view completed
"Juror Qualification Questionnaires."'32 The court found the
defendant's request unnecessary because prior public jury lists
were available and sufficient as a public record for the
defendant's purposes. 3' According to the Davenport court,
"there is no need to search for and use other sources.""4 The
Davenport court commented on the defendant's "frivolous explora-
tion" by noting that "[tihe defendant may be seeking those forms
as an aid for voir dire examination purposes, but that is not the
purpose of the questionnaires.""5
The Fourth Circuit in U.S. v. Cecil,"' appeared to be primari-
ly concerned with the administrative burdens and hardships that
would be created if the defendant's challenge to the jury selection
process was successful, and less concerned with the constitution-
ality of the process. In upholding the process, the court empha-
sized that voter registration lists had been uniformly used in the
federal system."7 The court was concerned that to hold other-
wise would encourage challenges in other circuits, and noted that
this would open up "opportunities for a criminal defendant to
stymie the orderly jury selection process ,]... render the effi-
cient administration of criminal trials in this circuit difficult
to voter lists where necessary to foster the policy and protect the
rights secured by sections 1861 and 1862 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (Supp. 1993).
129. Lewis, 472 F.2d at 255. Lewis addressed two additional issues: (1) the
failure of voter registration lists to include 18-20 year old voters; and (2) the fact
that the lists were four years old. Id. at 256-57. The court noted that the constitu-
tional amendment enfranchising 18-20 year olds was enacted in 1972, the year of
the defendant's trial. Id. at 256. The Lewis court then addressed the issue of stale
lists, noting that jury selection plans should use current voter registration lists;
however, in this case, the use of the stale list was constitutionally permissible be-
cause the jury was selected from a fair cross-section of the community. Id. at 257.
130. 824 F.2d 1511 (7th Cir. 1987).
131. Davenport, 824 F.2d at 1514. The Jury Selection and Service Act (the
'Act") permits the court to utilize its discretionary power to authorize supplemental
lists where necessary. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (Supp. 1993).
132. Davenport, 824 F.2d at 1514.
133. Id. at 1515.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 836 F.2d 1431 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
137. Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1454.
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beyond measure .... [And] put in jeopardy the operation of crim-
inal trials in this Circuit with disastrous effect on the enforce-
ment of criminal laws."" 8 These results would amount to a "dil-
atory tactic" which would be used to harass the court and delay
the trial."9 The court indicated that the jury selection process
had become, in many instances, a "nightmare of delays and con-
fusion for the courts."4 ' The court was concerned that the focus
of the trial had improperly shifted from a determination of the
defendant's guilt or innocence to the jury selection process."'
In Cecil, the Fourth Circuit vigorously asserted that changing
or supplementing source lists would create administrative bur-
dens and therefore the established system should not be al-
tered.'42 The court noted that the Constitution did not require
that the chosen jurors be a "statistical mirror of the community"
but rather "a 'fair cross-section' gathered without active discrimi-
nation."'"
Cecil implicitly distinguished between active versus passive
discrimination. The court indicated that the systematic exclusion
of a cognizable group is unacceptable active discrimination.'"
But the court found passive discrimination resulting from unex-
plained statistical imbalances to be acceptable. 4" The court re-
quired proof of intentional exclusion in order to avoid an admin-
istrative nightmare and change to the system. 46
The use of the list of actual voters in a presidential election as
opposed to the list of registered voters as a source list, was ad-
dressed recently in United States v. Douglas.'47 The court found
that a provision of the Jury Selection and Service Act (the
"Act") 48 permitted either list to be used for the master list. 4
The Douglas court also found that race played no role in a
person's ability to vote or to register to vote, and neither the
right to vote nor the right to register to vote was discriminatorily
138. Id. at 1454-55.
139. Id. at 1455.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1455. This assertion fails to consider that whether a
procedure is unconstitutional should outweigh whether a modification of that proce-
dure would impose administrative hardships.
143. Id. at 1445 (emphasis added) (citing Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982 (1st
Cir. 1985)).
144. Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1451.
145. Id. at 1454.
146. Id.
147. 795 F. Supp. 909, 913 (N.D. Iowa 1991)
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (Supp. 1993), The Jury Selection and Service Act is
set forth at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1982 & Supp. 1993).
149. Douglas, 795 F. Supp. at 914.
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denied to African-American individuals.' On this basis, the
court held that the list of actual voters was constitutional for jury
purposes.'5 ' The court also specifically found that this use re-
sulted in a constitutionally valid cross-section of the twenty-two
counties comprising its jurisdiction.'62 Moreover, the court rec-
ognized that this procedure was constitutional and did not violate
the Act, even though the use of lists of actual voters excluded
those persons who failed to vote in the particular election from
which the list was drawn. 53
A second issue in Douglas was whether African-Americans
were systematically excluded where the fifty jurors randomly
summoned for the venire did not include one African-American
prospective juror for an African-American defendant's trial.'54
The court rejected the defendant's argument, and reiterated the
proposition established by prior case law that there is "no re-
quirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the com-
munity and reflect the various distinctive groups in the popula-
tion.' 5
State courts have also examined the validity of using voter
registration lists as source lists. The Supreme Court of Kansas,
in the 1992 case of State v. Bailey,5 ' held that the use of voter
registration lists as the sole source for the selection of jury panels
was statutorily and constitutionally permissible.'57 In this case,
the defendant moved to discharge the jury panel because the use
of voter registration lists excluded potential jurors and resulted
in minorities being underrepresented on jury panels.'58 In sup-
port of this motion, the defendant in Bailey cited statistical evi-
dence showing that the total minority population of the county
was 12.7%."" The defendant also presented evidence demon-
strating that people who lived in areas with a majority of Cauca-
sians served on juries in greater numbers than people living in
areas dominated by minorities.' The defendant, however,
150. Id. at 914.
151. Id. at 913-14.
152. Id. at 912-13.
153. Id. at 913. The record indicated that an expert's opinion was considered at
the trial level. Id. The expert, Dr. Shipman, testified that "race is not a good predic-
tor of whether or not a given person will vote, and, outside of the deep South, race
itself does not seem to be an important factor in who does or does not vote." Id.
154. Douglas, 795 F. Supp. at 913.
155. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).
156. 834 P.2d 342 (Kan. 1992).
157. Bailey, 834 P.2d at 346-48.
158. Id. at 346.
159. Id. at 346-47.
160. Id. at 347.
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failed to produce statistics of the number of minority citizens
summoned for jury service for his trial, and failed to offer statis-
tics as to how many citizens of voting age resided in the areas in
which his jury was to be selected.''
The Bailey court noted, however, that the defendant produced
evidence demonstrating that minorities were less likely to regis-
ter to vote than Caucasians." 2 This evidence was countered by
the state's evidence that no barriers existed for minorities to
register to vote, and that the county had a rather extensive pro-
gram aimed at increasing voter registration among minorities
and persons of low income. 63 The state also presented evidence
that jurors were never refused or removed from jury service be-
cause of race and that the most influential factor affecting voter
registration was socio-economic status, not race."
The Bailey court concluded that unregistered voters were not a
cognizable group." Because the defendant failed to prove that
groups such as African-Americans or other minorities were sys-
tematically or purposely excluded, he had not established a pri-
ma facie case of discrimination.' 6
In Commonwealth v. Henry,"7 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court addressed the use of voter registration lists as jury source
lists. Recognizing that voter registration lists were generated
by computer without knowledge of race, and that these lists were
an established and acceptable source, the court rejected the ar-
gument that the use of voter registration lists was unconstitu-
tional because African-Americans were underrepresented." 9
161. Id.
162. Bailey, 834 P.2d at 347.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 348.
166. Id. In support of its assertion that unregistered voters were not a cogniza-
ble group, the Bailey court cited the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Duren v. Missouri
and Swain v. Alabama. Bailey, 834 P.2d. at 347-48 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357 (1979) and Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part by,
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
167. 569 A.2d 929 (Pa. 1990).
168. Henry, 569 A.2d at 933.
169. Id. In Henry, the source lists in Lancaster County's jury pool included
school census data as well as voter registration lists. Id. Only 2% of the residents of
Lancaster County were African-Americans. Id. In the year this jury was selected, the
computer tape of city school census data, which lists all persons over 18 living with-
in the school district, was not compatible with the county's computer tape and
therefore was not used in selecting the annual jury pool. Id. The impact of excluding
the city school census list from random selection cannot be underestimated. The
court indicated that 80% of the African-American population of Lancaster County
lived in the city. Id. Because the city school census information could not be used,
registered voter lists alone were used. Id. Reliance solely on voter registration lists,
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In People v. Gregory ZZ,173 a New York appellate court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the underrepresentation of African-
Americans on jury. panels was a result of systematic dis-
crimination. Although African-Americans were a substantially
large group in Ulster County, African-Americans were admittedly
underrepresented on jury panels.' The Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court held however, that the defendant
failed to prove that the underrepresentation resulted from any
inherent deficiency in the selection procedure." 2
The court's reasoning was predicated on the fact that the jury
panel lists resulted from random selection from the master index
of county voter registration lists.17 In addition to the random
selection procedure, the court emphasized that the community
outreach efforts to bring more minorities into the jury pool had
been undertaken by initiating discussions with members of the
local chapter of the NAACP and students at a local state col-
lege. 174
While the cases discussed above suggest that the use of voter
registration lists as source lists is necessarily constitutional, the
California Supreme Court, in People v. Harris,75 challenged
this proposition. In Harris, the defendants claimed African-Amer-
icans and Hispanics in Los Angeles County were systematically
excluded and underrepresented when a voter registration list was
the sole source for jury selection. 7" The defendant pointed to
the low percentage of minorities eligible to register to vote and
the even lower percentage of minorities already registered to
vote."'77 These figures were then compared with the much high-
er eligibility and registration figures of Caucasians.
78
In the Los Angeles jury selection process at issue, question-
naires were sent to those persons randomly selected from the
voter registration list. 79 The jury commissioner reviewed the
completed questionnaires and eliminated those persons that
according to the defendant, resulted in systematic exclusion of African-Americans
from the jury pool because "blacks, so it is claimed, do not register to vote in pro-
portion to their numbers." Id.
170. 521 N.Y.S.2d 873 (App. Div. 1987), appeal denied, 523 N.E.2d 321 (N.Y.
1988).
171. Gregory ZZ, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
172. Id. at 875.
173. Id. at 874.
174. Id.
175. 679 P.2d 1264 (Cal. 1984).





failed to comply with mandatory statutory requirements. 18° The
remaining persons who completed the questionnaires became the
master jury pool.1" ' The commissioner did not follow-up on
those who did not respond - their names were simply eliminat-
ed.
182
The California court in Harris cited its previous decision in
People v. Wheeler,' where the court noted that the require-
ment that the jury be selected from a fair cross-section of the
community was based on the notion that:
[11n our heterogeneous society, jurors will inevitably belong to diverse
and often overlapping groups defined by race, religion, ethnic or national
origin, sex, age, education, occupation, economic condition, place of resi-
dence, and political affiliation; that it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be
devoid of opinions, preconceptions, or even deep-rooted biases derived
from their life experiences in such groups; and hence that the only prac-
tical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the represen-
tation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective biases
of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel
each other out.'
The court then examined the evidence presented in this case.
After reviewing voluntary questionnaires completed by 98% of all
jurors in the pool for a three-month service period, the
defendant's expert revealed that only 5.5% were African-Ameri-
can and 3.4% were Hispanic." Comparing these figures to cen-
sus information, the defendant's expert testified that substantial
deviations existed for African-Americans and Hispanics; the ex-
pert indicated that the deviation was potentially between 50% to
67% for African-Americans and from 81% to 90% for Hispanics




The Harris court rejected the Attorney General's argument
that the percentage of African-Americans and Hispanics on the
180. Id.
181. Harris, 679 P.2d at 437.
182. Id.
183. 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
184. Harris, 679 P.2d at 439 (quoting Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 754-55). Recognizing
its inability to achieve representation of every race, religious, social, economic, politi-
cal, and geographical group in the community on every jury panel, the Wheeler court
attempted to approximate an ideal cross-section of the community within the limits
of random selection. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 754-55. In Wheeler, the court identified the
importance of the list being cross-representative from the start, noting that if a list
failed to represent a cross-section of the community, the process was constitutionally
defective. Id. at 757.
185. Harris, 679 P.2d at 438.
186. Id.
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venire should be compared with the percentage registered to
vote, instead of to the percentage of the total population. 7 The
Harris court observed that the defendant did not claim jury pan-
els did not constitute an unbiased cross-section of the voter regis-
tration list."' The court explained that because the percentage
of non-voting minorities substantially exceeded the percentage of
non-voting Caucasians, voter registration lists were not represen-
tative of the population.189
The court also noted that many counties relied upon voter
registration lists for the source of venires despite the known risk
of drawing unrepresentative juries because the requirements
necessary to vote were similar to those for jury service.'90 The
use of this list, the court reasoned, created a "pre-screening" pro-
cess. "' Nevertheless, the court did not specifically find that this
pre-screening process interfered with random selection.'92 The
court also explained that its use of total population figures for
comparison purposes was premised on statistical information. 9
Requiring the defendant to obtain data in the community on jury
eligibility, according to the Harris court, would be an insur-
mountable hurdle.
94
In holding that the exclusive use of voter registration lists as
jury source lists was unconstitutional, the Harris court distin-
guished People v. Sirhan,' in which the constitutionality of us-
ing a list of registered voters as the only source list was up-
held.'" The court in Harris noted that the constitutional validi-
ty of using only a registered voter list had been qualified by Ian-
187. Id. at 441.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Harris, 679 P.2d at 441-42.
191. Id. at 442.
192. Id.
193. Id. Harris quoted from statistical expert Professor Kairys, who stated, "el-
igible population figures are almost impossible to obtain." Id. (quoting David Kairys,
Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL. L. REV. 776,
785-86 n.63 (1977)).
194. Harris, 679 P.2d at 443. Harris also explored another method of statistical
analysis called absolute disparity and found underrepresentation of African-Americans
by 7.1% and Hispanics by 24.2%. Id. at 444. These figures were determined by sub-
tracting 5.5%, which is the number of Blacks completing the three-month survey,
from the census figure of 12.6%; and by subtracting 3.4% as the completed question-
naires by Hispanics having served on juries during this three-month period, from
27.6%. Id. The court hesitated to use the absolute disparity analysis because the
census figure of 12.6% for African-Americans in the general population permitted the
unconstitutional exclusion of all African-Americans from the jury pool, which is con-
trary to the understanding of a fair cross-section of the community. Id. at 445.
195. 497 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
196. Sirhan, 497 P.2d at 1148.
Duquesne Law Review
guage specifying that the use of the list must not result in the
systematic exclusion of, or discrimination against citizens.197
The court explained that statistics proved that the registered
voter list showed inherent disparity under the standard set forth
in Duren v. Missouri.'98 Therefore, the court concluded that Af-
rican-Americans and Hispanics were systematically underrep-
resented.' Because the defendant proved inherent disparity,
the question of whether the jury commissioner intentionally
caused this disparity was foreclosed."n This court held that evi-
dence of inherent disparity was sufficient.2"'
The court in Harris commented on the state's failure to rebut
defendant's proof of gross disparity.0 2 The court stated that the
state "has short-sightedly rested its entire argument on the mis-
taken claim that defendant failed to present a prima facie
case."2 3 In contrast to many courts that rely on prior case law
to maintain status quo analysis, this court analyzed this case on
its merits and candidly and logically expressed its reasons, offer-
ing detail for every step of its analysis. Harris presents a strong
argument that the use of voter registration lists as the only
source list should not automatically be upheld as constitutional.
Use of Random Selection to Draw a Fair Cross-Section of the
Community
Statistics have been used to both challenge and uphold the
representativeness of the jury venire. The U.S. District Court in
Puerto Rico, in the case of United States v. Marcano,°4 ex-
plained that "random selection" did not correlate to "randomness"
as used by mathematicians and sociologists.0 5 The court exam-
ined the Jury Selection and Service Act's legislative history and
concluded that random selection entailed the selection of names
by chance from registered voters lists:2"
The Marcano court then examined the statistics and upheld
197. Harris, 679 P.2d at 446.
198. Id. (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 366). See notes 84-90 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Duren.





204. 508 F. Supp. 462 (D. P.R. 1980).
205. Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 466-67 (quoting S. REP. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 16 n.9, quoted in, United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 973 (D. P.R.
1968)).
206. Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 467.
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the randomness which was employed. 7 The defendants assert-
ed that the names at the end of the list had no opportunity to be
selected as required by the Act.2" 8 The court rejected this argu-
ment, explaining that the Act did not require that the names at
the end of the jury source list had to be selected."' The court
further observed that a requirement that the names at the end of
the list be selected would violate random selection. 10
The defendants in Marcano further alleged that the following
were excluded from the jury pool: (1) the working class or those
of lower socioeconomic status, (2) the lesser educated, (3) non-
Caucasians and (4) young people.1 The court held that the
working class or those of lower socio-economic status were not
identifiable classes because these classifications were occupation-
based and lacked identification as to "actual income, personal
history and family background."
212
As to the defendants' allegation that "non-whites" were exclud-
ed, the Marcano court held that although "race" was a cognizable
factor, "non-whites" encompassed a multitude of diverse recogniz-
able groups and was therefore overly broad.213 According to
Marcano, the evidence failed to prove that the members of such a
broad and diverse classification as "non-whites" (which includes,
African-Americans, Asians and Native Americans) share similar
interests and, therefore, did not comprise a "separate identifiable
class."21'
207. Id. The court noted that, after the first name was drawn by lottery (the
22nd), every 25th name was drawn from a list of 1,701,217 registered voters until
68,000 were selected for jury service. Id. Note that the 25th number was selected by
dividing the number of names needed (68,000) by the list of 1,701,217 registered
voters, and 25 is the rounded figure. The defendant in Marcano asserted that the
Act required that a non-zero probability of selection be used for each name on the
list, and that the court had assigned a zero probability for the 1,217 remaining
names after the 1,700,000th position. Id.
208. Id. at 466.
209. Id. at 467.
210. Id.
211. Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 468.
212. Id. at 469 (quoting United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 974 (D.
P.R. 1968) and citing Figueroa v. Coin. of Puerto Rico, 463 F. Supp. 1212 (D. P.R.
1979) and United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957 (D. P.R. 1968)). Marcano
further referred to United States v. Kieifgen, which held that the "unemployed did
not constitute an identifiable group." Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 469 (citing United
States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977)).
213. Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 469.
214. Id. The court's conclusion was guided by the decision of the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Rodriguez which found that those of "Latin origin" were not a
separate cognizable group because "Latin origin" encompassed, for example, Cuban-
Americans, Puerto Ricans, Argentinean-Americans and Spanish-Americans who did
not share similar interests as one group but rather were several separate cognizable
groups. Id. at 469 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 588 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir.
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With regard to the claim of wrongful exclusion based upon age,
the Marcano court cited conflicting opinions as to whether the
young and less educated were cognizable groups.215 Instead of
following one of these lines of reasoning, the court in Marcano
examined the statistics for each group.1 ' As to persons between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine, the Marcano court found
there was a 6.2% difference between those in the jury wheel and
the 1970 census.217 The court held that this difference was not
significantly unreasonable and was insufficient to establish a
prima facie case of underrepresentation."' Statistics as to the
"less educated" were examined and found not to present a prima
facie case because: (1) the defendant did not consider the eligibili-
ty requirements of the less educated concerning age, residency
and English literacy and speaking proficiency; (2) the defendant
could not establish any underrepresentation of the eligible por-
tion of the less educated; and (3) the defendant failed to demon-
strate that such individuals were systematically excluded from
the qualified jury wheel.219
The constitutionality of the English language proficiency re-
quirement was also rejected by the Marcano court on the basis of
stare decisis, reflecting the need to make the District of Puerto
Rico consistent with the rest of the federal court system, which
requires English language proficiency.20 Although the court in
Marcano acknowledged that there was pending legislation before
Congress to permit the use of Spanish in the federal court sys-
tem, the court noted that even if the legislation were enacted, its
effect on the jury selection process would be too speculative to be
considered."
1979)).
215. Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 469. The following cases held that the young
are not a cognizable group: Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 137-38 (1974), United
States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Potter, 552
F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 590-93 (10th Cir.
1976); United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 852 (1976); United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686, 688-89 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973). The following cases rejected the proposition that the
less educated are a cognizable group: Kleifgen, 557 F.2d at 1296; Potter, 552 F.2d at
905. But see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 569-70 (1st Cir. 1970) (recogniz-
ing both the young and less educated as cognizable groups).




220. Id. (quoting United States v. Ramos Colon, 415 F. Supp. 459, 465 (D. P.R.
1976) and citing United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 594 (10th Cir. 1976)).
221. Marcano, 470 F. Supp. at 471. In an interesting twist concerning profi-
ciency in the English language, the defendants argued that persons were qualified as
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The court also preliminarily ruled on whether the clerk's or the
jury commissioner's failure to investigate unanswered jury ques-
tionnaires violated the Jury Selection and Service Act.222 The
court cited prior case law to establish that the Act contained no
requirement that the clerk or jury commissioner follow-up on any
unanswered forms. 3 Instead, the clerk or jury commissioner
had discretionary power in this regard, and failure to follow-up
was not "substantial noncompliance" with the Act.224
In light of this preliminary ruling, the court focused on wheth-
er including people who did not answer questions about marital
status, education, race and occupation in the jury qualified wheel
affected the random nature of the jury selection process.225 The
court found that these omissions did not affect randomness."
The Marcano court cited prior case law to establish that these
omissions were mere technical errors and harmless in nature,
incapable of constituting substantial noncompliance with the
Act."s The court noted that education, marital status and occu-
pation are addressed on a routine basis in voir dire.' To fur-
ther bolster its holding, the Marcano court reasoned that if data
concerning a juror's education, marital status, race and occupa-
tion were not included in the jury forms in the percentages al-
leged by the defendants, then the lack of data could not have
jurors because they were proficient in Spanish. Id. The court dismissed this argu-
ment due to a lack of supporting factual data. Id. The Marcano court provided the
following example of the jury selection process in Puerto Rico's federal system:
[A]n examination of the caselaw will show that "[iln Puerto Rico, where the
customary language is Spanish, not English, prospective jurors are routinely
examined by a district judge, in English, with an eye to their proficiency in
spoken English, before being admitted to the venire .... This is done after
they have submitted their juror qualification forms and have been provisional-
ly approved by the Clerk."
Id. (quoting Thornburg v. United States, 574 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1978)). After
reviewing the trial court transcripts, the court concluded that the jury was exten-
sively examined because several prospective jurors were eliminated for their inability
to understand English. Marcano, 508 F.Supp. at 471.
222. Marcano, 470 F. Supp. at 467-68.
223. Id. at 467 (citing United States v. Santos, 588 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979), and United States v. Jenison, 485 F. Supp. 655,
668 (S.D. Fla. 1979)).
224. Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 467 (quoting Jenison, 485 F. Supp. at 668).
225. Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 468. Percentages of items left unanswered in-
cluded in the jury qualified wheel were 1.9% regarding education, 5.9% on marital
status, 10.3% on race, and 21% on occupation. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 467 (citing United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 589 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977), and United States v. Evans, 526 F.2d 701, 706
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976)).
228. Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 468 n.10. The court did not mention race or the
absence of questions as to race.
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served as the basis for invidious discrimination.229
In Jackson v. State, 0 the defendant argued that he was enti-
tled to have the county's proportionate number of his race repre-
sented on both the jury pool and the jury venireY1 After review
of the pertinent Alabama statute and case law, the court dis-
missed the defendant's assertion that his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated; in upholding the selection pro-
cess, the court focused on the fact that the selection of the jury
venire was conducted at random from a list of licensed driv-
ers. 
2
A North Carolina case relied almost exclusively on statistics in
upholding the validity of the jury selection process. State v.
Avery," 3 noted that the court had previously concluded that a
nine percent difference between the percentage of African-
Americans in the county versus the percentage of African Ameri-
cans in the jury pool was non-discriminatory.2 The statistics
in the instant case showed a 9.6% deviation between the number
of non-whites in the eligible population and the number of non-
whites in the jury pool, which resulted in a deviation that was
only .6% higher than in the prior case. 5
Because there was no evidence that the jury commissioners
acted improperly, and because the statistics were nearly the
same as in Avery I, the court determined that the defendant's
right to an impartial cross-representative jury had not been vio-
lated."6 In Avery I, random selection occurred when the com-
puter selected every second, fourth, eighth, twelfth and fifteenth
name from a master jury list composed of taxpayers and regis-
tered voters. 7 The court distinguished this case from cases in
which the United States Supreme Court had determined that the
jury venire was selected in a discriminatory manner." This
court asserted that in the cases finding discrimination, the statis-
tical disparity was greater and there was also evidence that the
selection process was subject to abuse. 9 The court held that
229. Id. at 468.
230. 560 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
231. Jackson, 560 So. 2d at 1101-02.
232. Id. at 1102.
233. 337 S.E.2d 786 (N.C. 1985) [hereinafter Avery 111.
234. Avery II, 337 S.E.2d at 794 (citing State v. Avery, 261 S.E.2d 803 (N.C.
1980) [hereinafter Avery 1]).
235. Avery 1, 337 S.E.2d at 794.
236. Id.
237. Avery I, 261 S.E.2d at 805.
238. Id. at 806.
239. Id. at 806-07 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) and Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967)).
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the defendant failed to provide statistical evidence of under-
representation and further failed to demonstrate that the selec-
tion system was subject to abuse.'
Avery II suggested that Avery I set a status quo standard, from
which later cases could be judged by statistical comparison." 1 A
problem raised by the use of this closed window analysis is that
other issues are ignored. One issue that is ignored is whether the
random selection procedure designated in Avery I as to every
second, fourth, eighth, twelfth and fifteenth name selected should
be perpetuated in later cases. But the chances of this issue being
raised are unlikely if courts simply look to the percentage of
statistical disparity and compare it with the percentages in ear-
lier cases, rather than determining whether both the process and
the result comply with the fair cross-section requirement.
The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas case of Common-
wealth v. Rosado,"2 involved a challenge to the jury selection
process based largely on statistics. The defendant raised the
following issues: (1) whether the system in effect before 1993
violated the statutory requirement of random selection from a
representative list; (2) whether the 1993 representative list sub-
stantially underrepresented Hispanic people; (3) whether the
1993 representative list substantially underrepresented poor
people; and (4) whether the 1992 representative list violated the
statutory requirement of random selection because it contained
more names than actual people in Philadelphia.' " Through
September 1992, Philadelphia utilized voter registration lists to
obtain potential jurors.2 " Jurors drawn from this list were then
classified according to the ward in which they resided, and placed
in separate groups.'" According to the trial court, particular
wards could be overrepresented on jury venires.2"6
The defendant contended that the selection process resulted in
underrepresentation of Hispanics.2" The defendant's expert in-
240. Avery I, 261 S.E.2d at 807-08.
241. Avery II, 337 S.E.2d at 794.
242. 26 Phila. 22 (Phila. County 1993).
243. Rosado, 26 Phila. at 23.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 23-24.
246. Id. at 24.
247. Id. The defendant argued that every mailing meant rotating to a new
group each time so that different jury venires during different parts of the year
would be chosen from only certain precincts or wards from the City of Philadelphia.
Id. However, beginning in January 1993, Philadelphia employed a multiple-source
list of registered voters and of drivers eighteen years of age and over. Id. It had
discontinued its use of group and ward classification of jurors and rotating jurors by
group. Md Although the defendant contended that the jury list was compiled by the
Duquesne Law Review
dicated that although between 4.66% and 5.16% of voter-age
population of citizens in Philadelphia were Hispanic, only 2.4% of
the jury pool were Hispanic.2 8 The defendant contended that
this statistical disparity demonstrated that Hispanics were signif-
icantl' underrepresented in the jury venires." The defendants
also argued that the disparity was exacerbated by the jury
commissioner's failure to follow-up when questionnaires were not
returned.210  Despite defendant's arguments, the trial judge
ruled that the statistical evidence was insufficient to warrant a
finding of either a substantial underrepresentation or any sys-
tematic exclusion.251' The court determined that the source list
was derived in a facially neutral manner.252 The court also not-
ed that the selection process had recently been reformed.25
The trial court then addressed the defendant's contention that
poor people and welfare recipients were underrepresented in the
jury selection process.254 The court found that this group was
not a distinctive group or identifiable class, that the words "poor
person" were unable to be precisely defined, and that the defen-
dant failed to provide any evidence to prove the presence of a
quality or attribute defining or limiting the group.255 The defen-
dant failed to establish that poor persons shared attitudes, expe-
riences and interests that were different from those of the com-
munity at-large; therefore, they were not a cognizable group. 5
According to the trial judge:
Welfare recipients have never been a class singled out for distinct treat-
ment under the laws except those laws which may inure to their benefit.
Persons receiving monies from the government, whether through Social
Security, Welfare, Unemployment, or Workmen's Compensation are not
and should not be cognizable groups for jury selection. This court rejects
the classification.
257
The trial judge next addressed the issue of the duplication of
pre-1993 jury selection procedure, the trial judge held that the defendant failed to
prove that any significant number of jurors on the date of the trial would have been
chosen from the pre-1993 list. Id. at 25. The court found that, at most, 5% of the
jurors summoned were from the pre-1993 list. Id.
248. Rosado, 26 Phila. at 25-26.
249. Id. at 26.
250. Id. The court expressed concern over the jury commissioner's failure to fol-
low-up on unreturned questionnaires. Id.
251. Id. at 30.
252. Id.
253. Rosado, 26 Phila. at 30.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 31.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 32.
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names caused by merging voter and driver lists.258 The trial
judge found that this duplication was "neither purposeful nor ill-
intentioned.""9 The court found that no cognizable class was
intentionally excluded and further found that the defendant was
not prejudiced by this duplication.2" The court also noted that
there was no evidence that the representative nature of the panel
was compromised by duplication.281 The court, therefore, con-
cluded that the jury selection system did not violate the principle
of randomness and denied the defendant's challenge. 2
Use of Multiple Source Lists
While the use of multiple source lists represents an obvious
improvement over using only voter registration lists, the use of
multiple source lists has also been challenged. In State v.
Dogan,2" the defendant contended that African-Americans were
underrepresented even though multiple source lists were
used."' The defendant's challenge was based on the fact that
only two of the thirty-three persons selected randomly for his
jury panel were African-American." 5
Citing prior Arizona cases where underrepresentation alone
was insufficient to establish a prima facie case when only one
source list was used, the court in Dogan found the defendant's
argument to be without merit.2"' The court emphasized that the
state was not to blame when a citizen failed to register to
vote.267 Choosing not to act, such citizens excluded themselves
from jury service if the state did not affirmatively interfere.2
The court in Dogan asserted that the state need not act to correct
the appearance of underrepresentation as long as the state did
not create barriers to a person's ability to participate either as a
voter or as a juror.88
258. Rosado, 26 Phila. at 32.
259. Id. at 33.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 34.
263. 724 P.2d 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
264. Dogan, 724 P.2d at 1268. Lists of registered voters and licensed drivers
over the age of 17 were used as source lists. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. (citing State v. Bernal 671 P.2d 399, 403 (Ariz. 1983) and State v. Lee,
559 P.2d 657 (Ariz. 1976)). Lists of registered voters were the only source lists used
in Bernal and Lee. Dogan, 724 P.2d at 1268.




The Colorado Supreme Court, in People v. Sepeda,270 consid-
ered whether Weld County systematically excluded Spanish-sur-
named individuals by randomly selecting potential jurors from
merged multiple-source lists of registered voters, licensed drivers
and chauffeurs.271 While only 10.4% of those on the lists were
Spanish-surnamed persons, census data suggested there was
15.4% Spanish-surnamed representation in the community.272
The defendant contended that the court should use a city and
county directory, which had the same proportional percentage of
minority names as the census data percentages for Spanish-sur-
named individuals.273 The court noted that this list could not be
used because it was not computerized and there was no funding
available to convert it into a computerized form. 74 The court
found this determination to be within the trial court's discre-
tion.
275
The court also recognized outreach efforts to increase Spanish
participation on juries and efforts to use other lists, such as tax-
payer and welfare lists to enlarge minority participation in the
pool.27 Legal obstacles created by the confidential nature of
these lists prevented their use.277 Telephone and utility lists
were not used because of obvious gender discrimination, as male
household members were predominately listed over females in
the same household.27" The Sepeda court found no legal man-
date to equate a reasonably representative pool with representa-
tion that was perfectly proportional to census data.279 The court
concluded, "[wihile the selection process may not be perfect, we
cannot say that the jury pool is not reasonably representative of
the community.""0
270. 581 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1978).
271. Sepeda, 581 P.2d at 726.
272. Id. at 726-27.
273. Id. at 727.
274. Id. at 727.
275. Id.
276. Sepeda, 581 P.2d at 728.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. The court found a 5% difference between the 10.4% listed on the mas-
ter index and the 15.4% on the census figure. Id. The court further recognized that
dividing the 5% difference by the 15.4% census figure resulted in a comparative
disparity of 31% between the proportion of Spanish-surnamed individuals in the
master index and the census data for this community. Id.
280. Id.
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Judicial Interference With Random Selection
Courts have permitted other practices which interfere with
random selection. In United States v. Meredith,"' the defen-
dants alleged that the trial court erred in allowing rejected mem-
bers of an earlier array to sit on another case. 2 Hence, this is-
sue involved whether the inclusion of "passed-over" jurors failed
to follow the Jury Selection and Service Act. 3 In rendering its
decision, the Meredith court relied on the Tenth Circuit's ruling
in United States v. Davis."4
The trial court in Meredith questioned the official in charge of
the selection process to determine whether a jury had been cho-
sen at random from a representative pool.2"5 The administrator
and deputy clerk averred that a random selection procedure had
been followed." s Despite evidence indicating that the procedure
resulted in a low proportion of African-Americans, the trial court
stressed that a defendant was not entitled to a "specific statisti-
cal balance in a jury panel." 7 The court found that including
the "rejected" or "leftover" jurors did not interfere with a random
selection procedure."5
Specific exclusions have also been upheld despite constitutional
challenges. A recent case in the Third Circuit, Ramseur v.
Beyer,28 involved the intentional exclusion of two African-
Americans from a randomly selected panel of grand jurors.29
The excluded jurors were eventually empaneled.29" ' The court
noted that the assignment judge added the two African-Ameri-
cans to the pool, thus creating a panel representing a cross-sec-
tion of the community in order to obtain "an even mix" of various
backgrounds, including race, on the jury.2"s
281. 824 F.2d 1418 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 969 (1987).
282. Meredith, 824 F.2d at 1424.
283. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1982 & Supp. 1993).
284. Meredith, 824 F.2d at 1424 (citing United States v. Davis, 456 F.2d 1192
(10th Cir. 1972)). In Davis, the Tenth Circuit held that use of "leftover jurors" from
another trial was not precluded by the Act. Davis, 456 F.2d at 1196.
285. Meredith, 824 F.2d at 1424.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1424 n.3.
288. Id. at 1424.
289. 983 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993).
290. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1222.
291. Id.
292. Id. The assignment judge vocalized his deliberate intention on the record
by adding, "if any of you think that I am in any way being sneaky about it, please
understand that I am not. I am telling you like it is, and that is the reason I have
done what I have done." Id.
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The court ruled that the actions of the trial court could not be
condoned, even though the appellate court noted that the trial
judge was not altering the composition of the jury for invidious,
racially-discriminatory purposes, but was merely attempting to
make the jury more representative of the local population. 3
Interestingly, the court pointed out that the assignment judges of
Essex County routinely bypassed the statutorily mandated ran-
dom selection procedure in favor of selection based on the judge's
own subjective observation or "discretionary judgment" of poten-
tial jurors.29
The court in Ramseur observed that although the U.S. Su-
preme Court had not formulated a bright line test of mathemati-
cal standards to apply, inferences of unconstitutional exclusion
could be made where a significantly large disparity existed be-
tween the percentage of minority population and the percentage
of minority composition in jury panels, as compared to disparity
resulting from random chance."5 The court pursued this anal-
ysis, utilizing all three statistical approaches: absolute disparity,
comparative disparity, and standard deviation analysis.' Abso-
lute disparity is the difference between the percentage eligible
and the percentage that actually appeared in the venire; compar-
ative disparity is arrived at by dividing the absolute disparity by
the total number in the population group; and standard deviation
measures fluctuations from the expected value."s?
Applying a stare decisis analysis to the statistical figures, the
Ramseur court found the absolute and comparative analysis fig-
ures to be within an acceptable range." The court also found
that the standard deviation figure of 18.5% indicated that there
was less than a one in 10,140 chance that these figures resulted
293. Id. at 1226-28.
294. Id. at 1223. Proof of interference in random selection was provided by tes-
timony from these judges:
Asked if his choices were made as a result of his "discretionary judgment
about each person," the judge responded, "There is no question about that."
The record in this case contains many similar statements that show that
Essex County assignment judges used subjective criteria to select grand jurors
and often considered race, "a racial balance" or a "cross section" of black and
white jurors when assembling grand juries.
Id. (citations omitted).
295. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1231.
296. Id. at 1231-32.
297. Id. at 1232 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 & n.17 (1977)).
298. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1232. The absolute disparity figures were 14.6% for
the source list and 14.1% for the list of jurors qualified by the court to serve after
the court reviewed completed questionnaires. Id. at 1231. Comparative disparity fig-
ures were 40.1% for the source list and 39.3% for the qualified list. Id.
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from random chance.299 The Ramseur court determined that the
instant case was "virtually identical to the twenty-nine standard
deviations condemned in Castaneda," and concluded that the
underrepresentation was not the result of random selection.3
However, the court cautioned that a statistical finding of under-
representation alone did not constitute purposeful discrimination,
without a review of the factual circumstances of both the jury
selection procedure and the study."0'
The Ramseur court then examined the duration and scope of
the survey."2 Applying stare decisis, the Ramseur court con-
cluded that although the survey indicated there was non-random
underrepresentation, the two-year period was insufficient to
satisfy the standard under Castaneda that underrepresentation
must occur over a substantial time period to violate equal protec-
tion."'3 The court further noted that the use of voter registra-
tion and Department of Motor Vehicle lists was facially neu-
tral."° The court held that data produced by the defendant in
Ramseur failed to establish a prima facie equal protection viola-
tion.
3 0 5
The Ramseur court also compared the figures presented by the
defendant to the fair cross-section analysis for Sixth Amendment
violations in Duren v. Missouri." The court found that factors
such as the short time period of the study, the use of facially
neutral multiple source lists and the fact that there were "ongo-
ing" reform efforts to improve the representativeness of juries in
the state weighed against a finding that the Sixth Amendment
cross-section requirement had been violated.3"7 The Ramseur
court asserted that a presumption should be created where a list
appears to be representative "ex ante" even though "ex post"
evidence reveals that it is not representative."' In light of that
presumption, the Ramseur court concluded that ex post evidence
in the instant case was not sufficient to establish a Sixth Amend-
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1232 (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17).
301. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1233.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1233. Ramseur referred to Hobby v. U.S., 468 U.S. 339, 341 (1984)
(seven years was the period of study); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 487
(1977) (11 years was the period of study); and Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
481 (1954) (25 years was the period of study). Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1233.
304. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1233.
305. Id. at 1233-34.
306. Id. at 1234. See notes 84-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Duren.
307. Id. at 1235.
308. Id.
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ment violation."' The court also determined that the lack of
representation of African-Americans and women as forepersons
did not impact "on the otherwise representative array of the pan-
el. 31o
Asserting that the assignment judge had discriminated against
as many as five jurors on the basis of race in this case, the dis-
sent in Ramseur contended that the assignment judge had partic-
ipated in purposeful discrimination.31' The dissent noted that
the assignment judges routinely eliminated African-American
jurors if the individual judge believed that there were too many
African-Americans on a selection panel or if that judge believed
that a juror was "undesirable."312 The dissent also focused on
the removal and eventual reinstatement of African-American
jurors, and took issue with the majority's characterization of the
resulting prejudice to the defendant as minimal."3 Noting that
the African-Americans were reinstated to the jury only at the last
moment, the dissent contended that this procedure created the
impression that the African-American jurors were chosen as a
"last resort."314
The dissent asserted that the temporary exclusion of the Afri-
309. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1235.
310. Id. at 1237. Essex County judges testified that race was a factor in the
selection of forepersons. Id. at 1235-36. These judges determined race from apparent
physical characteristics belonging to racial groups because the questionnaires and
jury lists lacked data on race. Id. at 1236. The judges desired not only a cross-sec-
tion in the body of the grand jury, but also among forepersons. Id. One Essex Coun-
ty judge stated:
My ultimate choice may be based upon my desire to get a cross-section even
in the selection of the foreperson or deputy foreperson; although as I indicated
before, I do not think that it is a requirement. I think there should be a
certain number of men and I think there should be a certain number of
blacks and Hispanics and white and laboring groups and executive groups and
housewife groups who should not only be on the Grand Jury body but even
sharing as foreperson or deputy foreperson.
Id. In contrast to these efforts to increase cross-representativeness for forepersons,
the defendant's survey of thirty-three of sixty-six persons serving as grand jury
forepersons for terms beginning with 1979 and ending with September 1982 revealed
that only 6.1% were African-Americans. Id. The court did not focus on the individual
citizen's right to a fair cross-section but, instead, focused on "jury review" as a buff-
er for citizens from the abuses of the government's power. Id. Holding that a suc-
cessful Sixth Amendment challenge to the selection of the jury foreperson must show
that the foreperson exerted a strong influence over the other jury members, thereby
diminishing their views significantly during deliberations, the Ramseur court did not
find that the Essex County foreperson bore a constitutionally significant role in the
indictment process. Id. at 1237.
311. Id. at 1249 (Cowen, J., dissenting). Justices Mansmann and Nygaard
joined in the dissent. Id. at 1252.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1250.
314. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1249 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
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can-Americans jurors implied that they were second class citizens
and unworthy of being the first choice.31 The dissent was con-
cerned that the judge was furthering negative stereotypes of
minorities and that this stigmatization of African-Americans
would bias the jury against the defendant, for the defendant was
also African-American.
State V. Ji,317 a 1992 Kansas case, addressed another chal-
lenge to the exclusion of cognizable groups from source lists. The
defendant in Ji challenged the constitutionality of excluding
illiterates as potential jurors."' The exclusion of those who
were unable to read or write was held to be constitutional by the
court, because in the interest of fairness to the defendant, jurors
should possess a reasonable knowledge of the English
language. 19 The court noted that the right to vote and the right
to serve as a juror shared several commonalities, but a person's
status as a registered voter did not presume that one also had
the competency to serve as a juror.320
Other constitutional issues regarding jury selection raised by
the defendant in Ji concentrated on the defendant's argument
that aliens, foreign students, and handicapped persons were also
wrongfully excluded from consideration as potential jurors. 21
All of the groups were considered, but rejected by the court be-
cause the defendant's claim that the jury panel was improperly
selected was unsubstantiated and therefore failed to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.322
In State v. King,2' the North Carolina Supreme Court found
that interference with random selection was not discriminato-
ry.3 24 In King, names were selected for the jury list by taking
every fourth name from the tax list from the letters "A", "B", "C",
"D" and "M," rather than from the entire list.2 ' The court held
that this procedure was not prejudicial to the defendant, even
though the procedure was not a systematic selection of names as
315. Id. at 1250. The dissent criticized the majority's justification of the lower
court's actions in this case by pointing to a single instance in another case in which
an assignment judge had excused an admittedly prejudiced juror. Id.
316. Id.
317. 832 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1992).
318. Ji, 832 P.2d at 1183.
319. Id. at 1185.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1184.
322. Id.
323. 264 S.E.2d 40 (N.C. 1980).
324. King, 264 S.E.2d at 43.
325. Id. at 42.
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contemplated by the applicable statute. 2 The court found no
constitutional violation because the defendant could not show any
significant underrepresentation of African-Americans on the jury
list to indicate intentional discrimination."' 1
In State v. Langford,2' the issue was whether the clerk of
courts could routinely exclude certain occupational groups from
the jury list.32 The court upheld the process, noting that the
clerk had followed guidelines prepared by the court and had
acted as the court's agent.330 The court concluded that what oth-
erwise would have been improper interference with random selec-
tion was proper when undertaken pursuant to the court's direc-
tion."3'
In Commonwealth v. Henry,32 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania addressed the exclusion from jury service of those convicted
of lesser crimes." Such persons were excluded from jury ser-
vice based on their responses to questionnaires asking if they had
been convicted of a crime. 34 The court asserted that those con-
victed of juvenile and minor crimes were not entitled to the relief
afforded by Duren v. Missouri.335 The court concluded that the
defendant was not entitled to relief because the defendant nei-
ther alleged nor demonstrated that the exclusion was prejudi-
cial. 36
The cases discussed above involved criminal defendants. How-
ever, issues of interference with random selection are not limited
326. Id. at 43.
327. Id. The court stated:
While we do not condone the practice of choosing names only from certain
letters of the alphabet because the statute seems to contemplate systematic
selection of names from the entire alphabet, we perceive no prejudicial error
to the defendant in this case. The procedure was not so arbitrary or nonsys-
tematic as to fail to comply with [the statute]. The purpose of [the statute] is
to insure that jury lists are systematically compiled so as to rule out arbi-
trary, subjective, discriminatory selection methods which would be violative of
defendant's constitutional rights. There has certainly been no constitutional
violation since defendant has not shown any significant underrepresentation of
his race on the jury list or jury venire from which to infer there was inten-
tional discrimination.
Id.
328. 837 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 848 P.2d 1263
(Wash.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 118 (1993).
329. Langford, 837 P.2d at 1042.
330. Id.'at 1043.
331. Id.
332. 569 A.2d 929 (Pa. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).
333. Henry, 569 A.2d at 933.
334. Id.
335. Id. See notes 84-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of Duren.
336. Henry, 569 A.2d at 933-34.
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to criminal cases. The plaintiffs in a complex civil litigation case,
Haas v. United Technologies Corp.,"' challenged the exclusion
of women and young persons from special juries."s Before trial,
the parties had agreed to a special jury pursuant to the Delaware
Special Jury Statute."9 Before the special jurors actually ap-
pear in court, the attorneys alternately strike jurors from a
Prothonotary's list f forty-eight individuals until twenty-four re-
main.' At issue was the procedure used to select the list of the
initial forty-eight jurors."
The plaintiffs challenged the system, relying upon the follow-
ing statistics: the female population of New Castle County in
Delaware was 53%; the female composition of the jury pool was
only 33.9%; the jury panel in the instant case was only 16% fe-
male; the youngest member of the jury was thirty-seven."s4 The
Supreme Court of Delaware did not discuss the source of the list
itself. While the court noted that no specific guidelines existed for
jury selection by the commissioners, the commissioners acknowl-
edged that they had selected jurors on the basis of age and
education.'
The Haas court held that the foregoing statistical figures did
not demonstrate that the procedure was actually, intentionally,
or systematically exclusionary. 4' Nevertheless, the court ruled
that this selection process represented a potential abuse to state
court litigants. 5 The court recognized its responsibility to pre-
vent the potential for abuse from being realized, and directed the
superior court to draft guidelines for juror selection.' The Del-
aware Supreme Court emphasized the importance of random se-
lection and noted that, in drafting guidelines, the superior court
should focus upon the need to "ensure 'a cross-section of the pop-
ulation suitable in character and intelligence for that civil du-
ty., "347
The Supreme Court of Delaware suggested that random selec-
337. 450 A.2d 1173 (Del. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192 (1983).
338. Haas, 450 A.2d at 1180.
339. Id. at 1181. The Delaware Special Jury Statute is set forth at DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10 § 4541 (1974).
340. Haas, 450 A.2d at 1181 (citing DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10 § 4541 (1974)).
341. Haas, 450 A.2d at 1183.
342. Id. at 1184.
343. Id. The Superior Court Administrator indicated that the Commissioners
selected jurors between the ages of 30 and 70 who possessed more than twelve
years of formal education. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Haas, 450 A.2d at 1184.
347. Id. at 1185 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953)).
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tion should occur "from a special jury pool comprised of individu-
als meeting specified age, intelligence and educational require-
ments and ... special occupational skills" as permitted by
law. 8 The court also suggested a bachelor's degree from an ac-
credited college or university as a specific minimum educational
criterion.," The supreme court affirmed the superior court's
ruling in the instant case in favor of the plaintiffs, and simulta-
neously directed the superior court not to schedule any trial by
special jury until new rules were approved and available for
use.
3 50
A challenge to the jury selection process based on the under-
representation of eighteen through twenty-one year old African-
Americans was rejected in People v. Waters."' The Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court held that the defendant
had failed to prove at the pre-trial hearing that this particular
group was a cognizable group in the community."' 2 Further, the
defendant failed to prove that the underrepresentation resulted
from any systematic exclusion.353
The court addressed the issue of the "appearance of intentional
discrimination."" The court pointed out that the county had a
practice of seeking names and addresses of recent high school
graduates to supplement jury source lists; however, the court also
indicated that this practice was "concededly poorly adminis-
tered. 355 Noting that many high schools declined to respond to
this solicitation, the court concluded that although the program
was poorly administered, it adequately rebutted the appearance
of intentional discrimination. 6
The Florida appeals court case of Jordan v. State,"7 present-
ed a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the jury selection
process. In Sarasota County, although prospective jurors were
derived from voter registration lists, they were not chosen from
one list covering the entire county, but were selected from areas
consisting of four or five precincts. 358 The jury commissioner
then examined each selected person's voter registration card to
348. Haas, 450 A.2d at 1185.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. 510.N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 1986).
352. Waters, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 8.




357. 293 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1974).
358. Jordan. 293 So. 2d at 132.
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determine that person's ability to qualify as a juror.59 The
cards were examined to determine the voter's age, occupation and
felony record; then the names of qualified prospective jurors were
pulled randomly from a drum as needed for each jury panel. "
In Jordan, the master jury list for the defendant's trial was
composed of only five precincts in the county."" Based on the
precincts chosen, the chance of having more than four African-
Americans among the 1,344 potential jurors was less than one in
ten million. 2 The court concluded that the defendant had suffi-
ciently proven the "statistical dissimilitude" between 2.65% of
registered non-white voters and the .297% prospective jurors
selected for his list.
The defendant also argued that because the race of prospective
jurors was evident on the voter registration cards, the opportuni-
ty to discriminate based on race existed.3" The court deter-
mined that the jury precinct selection itself had been discrimina-
tory because jurors were chosen from all-white precincts." s
Here, jurors were not randomly selected in an objective manner
but, instead, in a subjective and impermissible manner, resulting
in purposeful discrimination.3" Under the analysis applied in
Jordan, because the selection must occur from the whole county
and not from political sub-units, any defendant would be discrim-
inated against if his or her jury list were drawn from precincts
having highly disproportionate members of any race." 7
Another example of interfering with random selection occurred
in Georgia where the names of potential Caucasian jurors were
placed on white cards and those of potential African-American
jurors were placed on yellow cards.' The use of the different
cards interfered with random selection and created the possibility
of an absence of minority representation on juries."9
Other factors, such as the length of the trial, tend to interfere
with random selection and make it even more difficult to obtain a
representative jury. 7' For practical reasons, the trial judge
359. Id.
360. Id. at 132-33.
361. Id. at 133.
362. Id. at 133 n.4.
363. Jordan, 293 So. 2d at 133.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 133-34.
366. Id. at 134.
367. Id. The court noted that this scenario would not be repeated because
Sarasota County had since abandoned this discriminatory, subjective approach to
juror selection. Id.
368. SEYMouR WISHMAN, ANATOMY OF A JuRY 29 (1986).
369. WISHMAN, cited at note 368, at 29.
370. JOE S. CECIL, E. ALLEN, & GORDON BERMANT, JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:39
must weigh the importance of the jury service against the juror's
need for job security."' This balancing is necessary to avoid ju-
ry panels consisting of reluctant jurors, or jurors with an inabili-
ty to focus on the facts of the case due to their own concerns.37
In lengthy trials, it is not unusual to find that the court has
excused over half of the jury venire because of employment hard-
ship. 73 For obvious reasons, lengthy trials reduce the possibili-
ty of inclusiveness and representativeness. Courts in various ju-
risdictions - both state and federal - have developed methods
to reach the goal of obtaining an impartial jury. The following
section will discuss the types of source lists and other solutions
that have been either suggested or employed.
COMPARISON OF SOURCE LISTS AND SOLUTIONS FROM VARIOUS
JURISDICTIONS
The ABA standards for selecting prospective jurors require the
court to review and test its use of jury source lists.74 The need
TRIALS 6-7 (1987).
371. CECIL, cited at note 370, at 6-7.
372. Id. The authors discuss the balancing of the jurors' needs against the
necessity of juries and state:
In trials lasting a week or less judges are generally reluctant to excuse per-
sons from jury service. However, as the anticipated length of trial increases,
the burden imposed on the potential jurors is given greater weight and more
jurors are excused. An extended absence from the place of employment can
result in economic loss and have a detrimental effect on the career of the
-juror. Many who are not employed nevertheless have personal responsibilities
that cannot go unmet for extended periods. In considering requests to be ex-
cused, the trial judge must balance the burden placed on the individual jurors
against the interest of the litigants in having a trial before a representative
cross section of the community. Too lenient a policy in this regard may need-
lessly excuse prospective jurors with characteristics that are typical of the
community . . . . On the other hand, too strict a policy may place improper
burdens on individual jurors and others who depend on them, causing resent-
ment toward jury service and perhaps even litigants.
Id.
373. id. at 7. The authors relate that:
[The jury selection process in a lengthy trial demonstrates the difficulty of ob-
taining a representative jury. Eighty-four persons appeared for jury selection
in a case that was to require a trial lasting more that two hundred days. Of
these, forty-eight persons were excused by the judge because of the hardship
lengthy jury service would impose. Those who were excused represented an
important segment of the community; they were more likely to have an educa-
tion beyond high school and more likely to have occupational experience that
was relevant to the commercial issues raised in the litigation. In fact, all
potential jurors with managerial, supervisory, scientific, or engineering experi-
ence were excused.
Id.
374. American Bar Association, Judicial Administration Division, Committee on
Jury Standards, Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management 4 (1993).
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for inclusiveness is clear in that the jury should be composed of
individuals with different life experiences. If the jury is not in-
clusive, an important and necessary perspective may be miss-
ing.T' When this perspective of "unsuspected importance" is
missing, the jury is less than fully inclusive. 7 ' The importance
of the missing perspectives cannot be quantified; these perspec-
tives may vary from the perspectives of those selected for jury
service, due to differences in values, attitudes and life experienc-
es.
Whether and to what degree the source list is representative
clearly affects inclusiveness. 77 We will only have representative
juries when source lists approach 100% inclusiveness. No mini-
mum standards define inclusiveness, beyond the widely accepted
assumption that jury source lists consisting of 80% of the popula-
tion is sufficient. The absence of a standard necessitates the use
of a multiple-source list. This involves merging another list, such
as a list of licensed drivers, with the registered voters list in
order to derive an inclusive compilation.
Other supplemental lists which may be used to achieve inclu-
siveness are local census lists, city and/or telephone directories,
lists of utility customers, and lists of those who pay state real
estate tax, personal property tax and income tax. Women and
young people may nevertheless be underrepresented in supple-
mental lists. These lists are also problematic because they con-
tain business entries, and the area covered is often not limited to
a particular political subdivision. In addition, multiple source
lists only become effective when they have been purged of de-
ceased persons or persons who have moved away from the juris-
diction.
Different jurisdictions have utilized a variety of methods to
procure jurors. One method widely used before computerized
random selection was the key-man system. Under the key-man
system, upstanding individuals in the community were appoint-
ed, and would propose to the court a list of names of other up-
standing individuals. 78 This system has also been referred to
as the "old boys" network.379 Summoning anyone found near the
courthouse, including pedestrians on the street was another
375. Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management, cited at note 374, at 4.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. SAUL M. KASSIN AND LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON
TRIAL 22 (1981).
379. KASSIN, cited at note 378, at 22.
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method of jury selection.88
Prior to random selection, there were a vast number of meth-
ods employed to select jurors. In fact, according to a 1961 United
States Department of Justice Report, 92 federal district courts
utilized 92 different methods of selecting jurors." * All of these
methods shared the same result: none generated juries that ade-
quately represented the local population. 2
Legislative Reforms
While some state legislatures have attempted to increase the
inclusiveness of their juror lists, many states still rely primarily
or exclusively on voter registration lists. In Arkansas, the master
juror list consists of the names of the registered voters in each
county.383 Potential jurors are selected from the list either by
computer, or through a process that begins with the selection of a
random number by the circuit judge; the clerk then takes from
the master juror list the name corresponding to that random
number and every one-hundredth person thereafter.3 This pro-
cess is then repeated until the proper number of potential jurors
has been selected.38 5
In Rhode Island, the jury commissioner, with approval from
the justice of the superior court, selects jurors from registered
voters by using electronic data processing equipment.38 This
occurs after the secretary of state certifies that the electronic
equipment was furnished with the names of all persons regis-
tered to vote in the cities and towns.387 The jury commissioner
supervises the equipment operator so that neither individual
determines which name shall be drawn.' After all names are
drawn, the machine compiles a list, randomly mixing the names
drawn.
389
In Colorado, the primary source for the master juror list is the
voter registration list for each county. 90 The Colorado Supreme
Court is vested with the power to supplement the master juror
list with names of licensed drivers and other lists of persons
380. Id.
381. Id. at 23.
382. Id.
383. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-32-103 (1994).
384. § 16-32-103(1).
385. § 16-32-103(3).




390. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-71-107(1) (West 1993).
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residing in the counties.391 The Colorado state court adminis-
trator must use electronic means to randomly select names from
the master juror list to comprise the master juror wheel."9 2
Interestingly, Colorado chose not to include utility customers,
property taxpayers and persons listed in telephone directories in
its master lists. 93 In Colorado, utility customer lists were con-
sidered to be biased in terms of economics and gender because
most utility listings are under the name of the male member of
the household.9 4 Also, these lists lack representation of those
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. 9 ' Because lists of
property taxpayers are biased against those unable to afford to
purchase property, the eighteen to twenty-one year age group is
significantly underrepresented. 9 Finally, telephone directories
are not used in Colorado, as the same biases present in utility-
lists are also present in telephone lists.397
In Hawaii, for example, the clerk for each circuit annually pre-
pares a master list.398 A state statute requires that the master
list be drawn from the voter registration list which must be sup-
plemented with names on other lists of residents, such as the
taxpayers and licensed drivers lists.3" The names of prospective
jurors are then chosen at random from the master list to make
up the master jury wheel.4"
To select names for the master jury list in Indiana, the jury
commissioners for each circuit court place in a box twice as many
names from the voter registration list for the county as are need-
ed for the grand and petit juries for the following year."° The
commissioners may supplement the voter registration list with
names from lists of utility customers, persons filing income tax
returns, motor vehicle registration, city directories, telephone
directories and driver's licenses.4"2 The box containing the se-
lected names is delivered to the clerk of the circuit court for the
391. § 13-71-107(1).
392. § 13-71-108.
393. Maureen Solomon, American Bar Association, Report & Recommendations
to the ABA Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, Management of the
Jury System 14 (1975).




398. 32-36 HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-11(a) (Supp. 1992).
399. § 612-11(a).
400. § 612-12.
401. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-4-5-2(a) (Burns 1992).
402. § 33-4-5-2(e).
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particular county."3 The clerk then draws the names of poten-
tial jurors from the box in the presence of the jury commission-
ers.
404
In Pennsylvania, the jury selection commission is required to
annually prepare a list of prospective jurors." This list must
contain the voter registration list of the county or the names
from other lists which the jury commission believes provide a
number of names equal to, or greater than, the number supplied
from registered voters.'" The commission may, but is not re-
quired to supplement the list with names from telephone, city or
municipal directories, tax assessment rolls, names of participants
in any state, county or local program authorized by law, available
names of participants of federal programs authorized by law,
school census lists and the names of any person who is not on the
master list but applies to the commission to be a potential ju-
ror.4 7 At least once a year, the commission must select the
names of the prospective jurors at random.4°
Certain county-level court systems in Pennsylvania, such as
Allegheny County, have used three jury source lists - voter
registration lists, licensed drivers' lists, and telephone directo-
ries.40 9 Significantly, if there is any discrepancy on the qualifi-
cation questionnaires or any failure of a potential juror to sign
the form, a commission staff member will investigate.4 0 Where
a signature is omitted, a staff member will interview and obtain
the signature of the prospective juror.411
Other jurisdictions have expanded the source lists beyond voter
registration lists. This increases the likelihood of obtaining a jury
comprised of a fair cross-section of the community. The master
jury list in New Hampshire is compiled from official records of
persons holding current driver's licenses or department of safety
identification cards.412 Each year, the department of safety com-
403. § 334-5-2(a).
404. Id.




409. Technical Assistance Report, Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas,
Jury System Review, by The National Center for State Courts 2 (on file at the Na-
tional Judicial College).
410. Technical Assistance Report, cited at note 409, at 3.
411. Id. This investigative procedure is effective. In 1988, for example, the
commission staff investigated 73,000 out of 100,000 individuals sent questionnaires.
Id. The staff members were able to qualify 60% to 65% of the total individuals in-
vestigated (approximately 60,000 to 65,000 persons). Id.
412. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 500-A:l (Supp. 1993).
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piles a master jury list for each county or district within the
state. 4"3 The clerk of courts then selects prospective jurors from
the list randomly, by drawing or by computer."'
In New Jersey, the assignment judge for the superior court of
each county must prepare a jury list from the lists of the names
of all the registered voters and the licensed drivers in the coun-
ty."5 The assignment judge must then direct that a public ran-
dom drawing be made of the names of persons to be called for
jury duty.
41
Each county clerk in New Mexico must provide the secretary of
state with a list of the registered voters in the county, and this
list is then made available to the state general services depart-
ment.41 The director of the motor vehicle division must provide
to the general services department a list of all the licensed driv-
ers in each county."8 These two lists are merged to form the
master jury data base and the names of potential jurors are then
selected randomly by computer. 4"9 These names of potential ju-
rors are provided to the district or magistrate courts.420 In cases
where the county has adequate computer capability, the general
services department may transfer the master jury data base to
the county and the county may perform the random selection of
names.
42 '
In Wisconsin, each county board has the power to determine
whether the selection of jurors will be made by the clerk of the
circuit court or by the jury commissioners appointed by the cir-
cuit court judges. 22 The Wisconsin Department of Transporta-
tion provides a list of persons residing in the county where the
circuit court is located to the clerks of the circuit courts each
year.4"2 The jury commissioners randomly choose two hundred
names from the department list or from a master list comprised
of the department list and one or more additional lists of county
413. § 500-A:2. This procedure replaces the prior selection process whereby
town lists, which were derived from the voter registration list, were compiled by the
town selectmen and used as the basis for the master jury list. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 500-A:1, 500-A:2 (1983), amended by N.H REV. STAT. ANN. §§500-A:l, 500-A:2
(Supp. 1993).
414. § 500-A:6.
415. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:70-4 (West 1994).
416. § 2A:70-4a.





422. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 756.03 (West Supp. 1993).
423. § 756.04(1).
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residents, including but not limited to voter registration lists,
telephone and municipal directories, utility company lists, lists of
real property taxpayers, lists of high school graduates or lists of
persons receiving general relief or aid to families with dependent
children.424 The list is to include a statement which sets forth
the manner in which the list was compiled and the sources from
which the names were derived.42 The names of those on the
list who are eligible for jury service are then randomly drawn by
the clerk of the circuit court.426
Of the jurisdictions mentioned, Delaware has been the most
successful in compiling a representative jury list. The Delaware
jury list includes 94.5% of citizens 18 years of age and over.427
The lists are derived by random selection from merging and regu-
larly maintaining registered voters and licensed drivers lists for
each county.42 The Delaware Methodology Manual for Jury
Systems sets 85% as the minimum for inclusiveness.429
Many of the states discussed rely heavily upon voter registra-
tion lists as a source of names for jury selection. Therein lies the
problem. The list of registered voters tends to underrepresent
minorities, the poor, the young, the elderly and the less educated
and tends to overrepresent Caucasians, the middle-aged and
those who are better educated." ° Surveys show that some peo-
ple do not register to vote in order to avoid the call of jury du-
ty. 431
Voter registration lists will become even less representative of
our citizenry because experts have predicted that non-voters will
increase in numbers in the future.432 This concern over the in-
clusiveness and representativeness of voter registration lists led
one federal judge to recuse himself from jury challenge petitions
because he strongly believed that voter lists were unsatisfactory
and incomplete as to minority representation.' The judge rec-
ognized that minorities and the youth of our nation were not
registered to vote in the same ratio as middle-aged Cauca-
424. § 756.04 (am) 1.
425. § 756.04(2).
426. § 756.04(3).
427. Mark S. Vavala, Statistical Report on Juror Use and Management for
Superior Court of the State of Delaware 4 (1992) (on file with the author).
428. Vavala, cited at note 427, at 4.
429. Id. at 5. According to the Delaware Jury Manager, "Delaware, then, is
well above this standard." Id.
430. WISHMAN, cited at note 368, at 29.
431. Id.
432. 1 ANN FAGAN GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL & CRIMINAL TRIALS 306
(1984).
433. GINGER, cited at note 432, at 308.
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sians.' He further criticized the federal system because the
use of the lists created further inequities; he asserted that the
computerized random selection from the lists favored suburbs
over cities, small towns over the suburbs, short streets over long
streets and persons living in single dwellings over those living in
multiple-unit dwellings.45
Concerned organizations, such as The League of Women Vot-
ers, have studied the lack of representativeness of voter lists."5
The results of these studies pointed to the failure of administra-
tors in voter registration offices to encourage participation. 7
The next section of this article analyzes how jurisdictions are
trying to improve their community's perception of a fair and
impartial jury.
NEW TRENDS
Numerous suggestions and proposals have been made to make
juries more inclusive and thereby improve the community's per-
ception of the fairness of the jury system. One proposal, currently
under consideration by the Pennsylvania General Assembly, is a
bill that proposes "jury peer representation."' The bill's draft-
er, Representative Harold James of Philadelphia and a supporter
of the legislation, Linda Bebko-Jones of Erie, have indicated that
they intend the bill to mandate minimum representation of mi-
norities on juries in order to prevent discrimination in the jury
process." These legislators recognize that even though Batson
affords minority defendants and victims opportunities to curb
discrimination, minority defendants and victims have no legal
434. Id. (quoting United States v. Burkett, 342 F. Supp. 1264, 1265-66 (D.
Mass. 1972)).
435. GINGER, cited at note 432, at 308 (quoting Memorandum of Judge
Wyzanski, U.S.D.C. Mass., January 15, 1973, Statement of Disqualification from
Cases Postponed Because of Motions Relating to Jury Composition, 12 CRiM. L. REP.
2403 (1973)).
436. GINGER, cited at note 432, at 308.
437. Id. The author states:
According to this study, election officials have never been required to take
affirmative steps to encourage people to vote. Furthermore, they have never
been required to adopt practices to increase voting convenience. The study
noted that 38 percent of all polling places observed were not clearly marked,
58 percent of the surveyed polling places lacked convenient public transporta-
tion, and 89 percent of the local voter officials in the communities observed
did not publish a voter information guide.
Id. at 308-09.
438. H.B. 1182, 177th Gen. Assem., 1993 Reg. Sess. (1993).
439. Harold James, Memorandum, Proposed Legislation, Jury peer Representa-
tion (February 2, 1993) (on file with the author); Interview with Linda Bebko-Jones,
Member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives (April, 1993).
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recourse should the jury panel or pool lack peer representa-
tion."
This bill targets minorities who are members of either a signif-
icant or small racial group, and correlates census figures with the
twelve members of the jury."1 The bill provides that if a defen-
dant or victim is a member of a racial category which represents
one-fourth or more of a judicial district, and there is no juror
from the same racial group, then three jurors of the victim's or
defendant's race must be selected." 2 If a defendant or victim is
a member of a racial group of one-sixth or more of the district,
but less than one-fourth, the proposed bill guarantees two jurors
from that racial group will serve on the final jury panel.' Fi-
nally, if a defendant or victim is a member of a race comprising
less than one-sixth of population of a judicial district, then one
juror from that racial group will serve on the final jury panel. 4
Another recent development which may increase minority rep-
resentation on juries is the new federal "motor voter" law."5
Under this law, citizens can register to vote by applying for or re-
newing their drivers' licenses."' The motor voter law forbids
the purging of names from voter lists for reasons other than
those explicitly set forth in the law."7 Under the new law, a
name is purged from the list only when a potential voter incurs a
felony conviction, becomes mentally disabled, dies, relocates to a
new jurisdiction or makes a personal request.' While this leg-
islation is a positive step toward achieving representative jury
source lists, it creates difficulties. One example is the administra-
tive burden of keeping track of voters who move and fail to quali-
440. James, cited at note 439. Bebko-Jones, cited at note 439.
441. H.B. 1182, 177th Gen. Assem., 1993 Rbg. Sess. (1993).
442. H.B. 1182 § 1 (a)(1).
443. Id. at § 1 (b)(1).
444. Id. at § 1 (c)(1).
445. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (Supp.
1993).
446. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3. See Gary Wesman, 'Motor Voter' Law Seen as Boost
to Electoral Process, ERIE MORNING NEWS, May 21, 1993, at B1. Currently, Erie
County records indicate that only two-thirds (2/3) of voting-age adults are registered
voters. Id. Well before this law was passed, Vernon Dobbs, the Director of the State
Welfare Department's Public Assistance Office in Erie, acknowledged that his office
had been helping citizens to register to vote for approximately eighteen months prior
to the passage of the new law. id. Recipients were asked if they are registered to
vote, and if not, they are provided with voter registration forms to fill out at their
convenience. Id.
447. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6 (a).
448. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-6 (a)(3)-(4). Previously in Pennsylvania, if a citizen
had not voted in two years, he was removed from the registered voter rolls. 25 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 951-38 (Supp. 1992).
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fy because of the restrictions.
Although the administrative burden may be increased, if the
new law achieves the dramatic growth in voter registration that
is anticipated, voter registration lists will more accurately repre-
sent the community. Citizen participation will expand, and the
jury selection process will benefit from the access to a greater
number of potential jurors. As was previously mentioned, the
more inclusive a voter registration list, the greater the chance
that a jury pool will accurately represent the entire community.
Pennsylvania legislators have also proposed that, upon gradua-
tion, all high school students receive a voter registration form
with their diploma."9 In addition, the Pennsylvania General
Assembly has also introduced a bill that would permit easier
access to voting for the homeless.450 These proposals increase
the representative nature of the jury pool and forbid the use of
voter registration lists as source lists for jury selection."5
The American Bar Association proposes the following steps for
implementing the jury selection process to prevent any discrimi-
natory practices:
1. Compare the source list being used for the names of potential jurors
with population data of the jurisdiction.
2. Take corrective action(s) such as supplementing the source list with
additional lists.
3. Examine court policies on granting excuses.
4. Take corrective action(s) such as establishing written and uniform
procedures for granting excuses.
5. Examine court practices with respect to peremptory challenges during
the voir dire process.
6. Take corrective action if the voir dire process discriminates against
any cognizable group in the jurisdiction. 2
Others have argued in favor of class conscious juries as a pos-
sible solution. Until 1970, jurors in the District of Columbia of
the same socio-economic background as the litigants were select-
ed to assess condemned property value because the jury repre-
sented a trial by one's "peers."53 These condemnation juries
were patterned after the Norman concept that a jury composed of
449. S. 1552, 177th Gen. Assem., 1993 Reg. Sess. (1993).
450. H.B. 2295, 177th Gen. Assem., 1993 Reg. Sess. (1993).
451. See Joseph Coleman, House Dems propose bills to boost voter registration,
ERIE MORNING NEWS, March 24, 1993. This prohibition is based on the assumption
that many people do not register to vote for fear of being selected for jury service.
452. Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management by the American Bar
Association 17 (1983).
453. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COM-
MITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 10 (1977).
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knights who owned property should decide a case involving a fel-
low knight."'
Class conscious jurors fulfill the jurors' and the judicial
system's need for understanding a particular defendant.' 6 How-
ever, sole use of one's class undercuts the entire community's role
in the judicial process, and ignores the defendant's and the
victim's needs.6 Nevertheless, choosing a jury designed to rep-
resent both the accused and the victim also presents administra-
tive and philosophical difficulties."7 The specialized jury would
require that court administrators handle each case individually,
thereby delaying an already prolonged process.6"
Some researchers have suggested redistricting as a means to
achieve proportionate representation on jury pools.'59 Support-
454. VAN DYKE, cited at note 453, at 10.
455. Id. The author states, "[those who advocate a class-conscious jury have ar-
gued that the economic and social conditions of the black community, for instance,
cannot be understood except by persons who live there, and hence that black defen-
dants should be judged by all-black juries." Id.
456. Id. at 10-11. As indicated by the author:
The problem with a jury drawn only from a narrow group - from the commu-
nity of knights if the accused is a knight, for example, or from the black
community when the defendant is black - is that such a jury fails to recognize
adequately the concept of community. The jury's role is not only to protect the
accused but to represent the public that has been victimized. A jury composed
entirely of members of the defendant's racial or socioeconomic group would
certainly be able to understand the defendant's point of view but might not be
able to understand the perspective of the victim. In contemporary society, se-
lection of a jury must take into account the fact that the victim may come
from another part of the community than the accused. For this reason,
.community" must be broadly defined. The point of view of the victim's com-
munity would not be represented in a "specialized" jury consisting only of the
defendant's peers. Only in a situation that is truly self-contained, such as a
minor crime on Native-American land, would a jury drawn from only one
group serve as an impartial arbiter representing all the competing factions.
Id. at 10-11.
457. Id. at 11.
458. Even if it were feasible to handle each case in a distinct manner, Van
Dyke notes:
Such juries would be administratively impossible to achieve in today's society,
which includes many more than two identifiable groups and where the groups
relevant to the case might differ according to the crime. (For example, a black
woman who had been raped might consider her 'community" in this case to
be women; while if she had been robbed by a white, she might consider it to
be blacks, both men and women).
Id.
459. Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L. J. 531, 548 (1970). The au-
thor states:
It is possible to solve the problem of both numbers and control. In Northern
urban areas, jury districts could be redrawn so that each black community
would constitute a jury district, or vicinage, the other vicinages being predomi-
nantly white. Juries drawn from vicinages duplicating the boundaries of the
black community would be by natural consequence all-black. In the Black Belt
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ers of the redistricting or vicinage proposal do not believe that
redistricting polarizes races.4® Instead, they assert that as so-
ciety becomes less racist, the different districts will also become
less polarized with regard to color.461 Through redistricting, the
burden of eradicating racism is on society as a whole, rather than
on the jury system. 2 A redistricting proposal, however, offers
no solution to the problem of a non-representative jury and a
defendant who is a minority in the community.
Another proposal involves the use of a formula to determine
the number of minority jurors necessary in a case through calcu-
lating not only the degree to which race is central to the verdict,
but also the number of minority jurors necessary to arrive at a
fair decision.' This final number is contingent upon the minor-
ity interest that is affected by the issue.' The weight given to
this interest plays a significant role in resolving the pressing
issue."'
Other researchers dismiss the argument that juries should
include proportional representation based on the percentage of
the minority population. They argue that the result of such a
system would be that one African-American would be on every
jury and proportional representation of every identifiable group
in the community would be impossible.'
Another problem arises where entire classes or categories of
individuals are excluded from jury service. For example, until
counties of the rural South, however, the black and white communities are not
so readily distinguishable, and the problems outlined would not be solved
simply by reconstituting jury districts. Here we would do better to require
that every jury be proportionately representative of the black population in the
vicinage. In most cases this would yield juries that are at least three-quarters
black.
The problem of numbers and control could be solved in the federal
context by dividing federal jury districts into sub-districts paralleling the pro-
posed state jury districts in the North, and paralleling counties (that is, exist-
ing state jury districts) in the South. Legal problems that black people face
tend to arise where they live and carry on their daily business. By requiring
that juries trying civil cases be drawn from the community where the cause of
action arose, and in criminal cases where the crime occurred, we could ensure
that civil and criminal law for black people would be administered by substan-
tially all-black juries.
Id.





465. The Case for Black Juries, cited at note 459, at 549.
466. Id. at 549 n.90.
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1984, Georgia excluded the following individuals from jury ser-
vice:
1. Police and other law enforcement officers employed or appointed on a
full-time basis.
2. Officers and personnel of any court employed or appointed on a full-
time basis, including attorneys at law engaged regularly in the practice
of law in Georgia.
3. Officers, firemen and other personnel of any fire department employed
on a full-time basis.
4. Physicians, surgeons, medical intern and medical technicians actively
engaged as such.
5. Dentists and pharmacists, duly licensed, who are engaged in the prac-
tice of their profession.
6. Persons who are sixty-five years of age or older.
7. Any other person summoned to jury duty may be excused by the judge
upon a showing that he will be engaged during the term of his service in
work necessary to the public health, safety or good order or that she is a
housewife with children fourteen years of age or younger.
8. Any teacher or principal of Georgia who does not desire to serve upon
jury may obtain a permanent excuse by notifying the clerk in writing of
that fact.
67
Experts recommend that blanket exemptions for individuals in
certain occupations should be eliminated.' Historically, these
exemptions derived out of a need for safety in the community."
For example, requiring the town's only doctor to serve as a juror
for a two-week trial would be a community hardship.4 70 Today,
however, numbers have grown in most, if not all, occupations,
and jury service is frequently limited to a brief period of time. If
occupational excuses are necessary, the court should listen to
each juror's situation and excuse individually, rather than grant
blanket exemptions. The removal of blanket exemptions is in
keeping with the principle of inclusiveness, and represents how
laws must change with the pace of society.47'
G. Thomas Munsterman and Janice T. Munsterman 472 pro-
467. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-1, amended by, Ga. L. 1984, p. 1697, § 1 (1984).
See Andrew W. Estes, The Psychology of Jury Selection, Carrying the Show, ATLA
152-53 (1983).
468. G. Thomas Munsterman & Janice T. Munsterman, Jury Management
Study, State of Hawaii 11 (1990) (on file with the author).
469. Munsterman, cited at note 468, at 8.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 11. The authors note:
As the courts strive for wide citizen participation in the jury process, as the
use of multiple source lists and short term of service indicate, the singling out
of certain professions is no longer in keeping with the intent of jury service
and makes the public admonitions for universal participation somewhat hollow.
Id.
472. G. Thomas Munsterman and Janice T. Munsterman are Director of the
Vol. 33:39
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pose yet another alternative. Using a stratified selection process,
every "n"th name is selected following a random start.473 The
list is then divided into groups based on relevant demographic
characteristics.47 Each group is then sampled at random to ar-
rive at a venire representing the desired cross-section of the
community.'75 The Munstermans suggest that this type of selec-
tion can also occur at "secondary random draws."476 A secondary
random draw can occur in the selection of panels from the list of
those qualified to serve. 77
A second method of stratification suggested by the
Munstermans is to select by district, town or voting precinct and
to draw the same percentage of names from each subdivision.'
Use of district stratification ensures that each subdivision in the
community is proportionately represented.'79
A final stratified selection procedure proposed by the
Munstermans modifies each district by proportionately selecting
jurors out of each district to compensate for the difference be-
tween districts." ° This guarantees proper representation among
citizens from each district. 1 To employ this method, however,
jurisdictions must gather the necessary evidence to support the
calculations of selection weights and to formulate the strata char-
acteristics of each group.
The 1991 Report of the New York State Judicial Commission
on Minorities proposed a different solution. 2 A recommenda-
tion was made to either increase jury fees to an amount which
will make it economically possible for all income brackets to
serve on the jury, or to require employers to continue paying a
juror's regular salary while employees are on jury duty.8 3
An additional method to increase representativeness is to en-
Center for Jury Studies and staff associate, respectively, of the National Center for
State Courts.
473. G. Thomas Munsterman and Janice T. Munsterman, The Search for Jury
Representativeness, 2 JUST. SYs. J. 59, 74 (1986).




478. Id. at 75.
479. Munsterman, cited at note 473, at 75.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, Vol. 2
(April, 1991) 225 (citing New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, Re-
sponses to Questionnaire for Judges in New York State on Issues Relating to Profes-
sional Experiences and Perceptions of Fairness and Sensitivity in the Courtroom).
483. Report of the New York State Judicial Commission, cited at note 482, at
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courage participation.' Before participation can increase, how-
ever, the judicial system must find ways to ensure that a citizens'
participation is "meaningful and useful."4 5 This will help to en-
hance both the citizens' perception of the court system, and de-
crease a citizens' reluctance to participate on a jury.' A de-
crease in the reluctance will also increase the quality of jury
panels."7 As our judicial system strives to become, and does be-
come, more inclusive, our perception of the cornerstone of that
system - the jury - will come to reflect that inclusiveness, and
more citizens will be willing to participate.
Even as legislators and community groups have deplored the
lack of minority participation on juries, courts have begun to take
action. The Fifth Circuit has recognized the distinction between
the issue of whether a particular jury was picked by random
selection, and whether African-Americans actually served on the
jury."' Courts should recognize the importance of whether mi-
nority jurors were actually summoned and served. Concern for
whether the process is legitimate in its exclusion should not be
relevant to the inquiry.' Concern as to how many African-
Americans or other minority group members should compose a
jury panel are matters that should be answered by legislators
and administrative agencies. If they fail to act, the courts must
step in.
484. A Guide to Juror Usage, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Na-
tional Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, 1-2 (December 1974) (on file with the author).
485. A Guide to Juror Usage, cited at note 484, at 1-2.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. See, e.g., Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 12-13 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 975 (1967).
489. Supporters of this policy believe:
Court[s] will find that meaningful black representation in race-related cases is
constitutionally compelled when it accepts one or both of two principles. First,
when black people are not represented on juries, the black community and the
black criminal defendant or civil litigant are denied the equal protection of the
laws; any process which results in the absence of black jurors is constitution-
ally suspect. While random selection may in some cases suffice, any method of
restricting jury service which is adopted creates a consequent obligation to
ensure that that method does not result in the absence of blacks from juries.
Second, in state criminal cases, any black defendant tried by a jury which
does not significantly represent black people is denied a fair trial. The accep-
tance of either or both of these principles presumes that the Court[s] will
remove the hurdles it has set up. But whether black representation be
achieved by constitutional command or legislative or administrative innovation,
another, and equally crucial, question will remain: how large should the black
presence be? Not "whether black jurors," but "how many?"
The Case for Black Juries, cited at note 459, at 547.
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RECENT INNOVATIONS BY THE COURTS
In Ramsey County, Minnesota, District Court Judge Lawrence
Cohen recently ruled that, in the interest of fairness, a Hispanic
man could not be tried from a randomly selected pool of 113
prospective jurors that included only one Hispanic.' Ramsey
County utilizes a random selection process to derive a jury
list.491 According to the 1990 census, 2.2% of the residents of
Ramsey County are Hispanic.49 Judge Cohen and the attorneys
involved in the case agreed to supplement the jury pool with the
names of two more Hispanic individuals who were already sched-
uled to be called for jury duty the next week.9 ' This is an ex-
ample of the court employing its own methods to accurately re-
flect the entire community. Judge Cohen's mandatory minimum
representation should result in more attorneys requesting a ra-
cially balanced jury, and will hopefully encourage other judges to
address this issue.
Judge M. Andrew Dwyer, Jr., of the New York Rensselaer
County Court, has utilized an innovative "coupon" idea to encour-
age community participation in the jury process.4" This coupon
urges individuals to volunteer their names for the master juror
list.49 Approximately one thousand people responded to the
coupon call for jury service.49 ' Several hundred people respond-
ed to a similar advertisement in 1984.
497
In addition, Judge Dwyer stresses the importance of expanding
source lists to increase minority participation on juries.49 His
master source list has included, but is not limited to, names from
the Department of Motor Vehicles licensed driver list, New York
State's income taxpayers list, the Board of Elections voter regis-
tration list, housing authorities in the community, and volunteers
490. Transcript of Proceedings, Minnesota v. Charles (No. KO-92-1621) (Minn.
2d Jud. Dist. August 10, 1992) [hereinafter Charles Transcript].
491. Charles Transcript, cited at note 490, at 4.
492. Id. at 6.
493. Id. at 8-9.
494. Eric Drexler, Court issues juror coupon, TROY NEW YORK REcORD, January
7, 1993, at C1. The coupon reads "I WANT TO BE A JUROR" across the top, and
has blanks for the individual's name, address and telephone number. Id. The bottom
of the coupon indicates the address to which it should be sent, and also states, "I
would like to be placed on the jury eligibility list. I am at least 18 years old, a resi-
dent of Rensselaer County and have no felony convictions." Id.
495. Drexler, cited at note 495, at C1.
496. Telephone interviews with the Honorable M. Andrew Dwyer, New York
Rensselaer County Court Judge (August 6, 1993) and Peter Minahan, Jury Commis-
sioner of Rensselaer County (October 24, 1994).
497. Telephone Interview with Judge Dwyer, cited at note 496.
498. Id.
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from the newspaper coupons.4 Names are selected randomly
by computer from the master source list.5" After random selec-
tion, most jurisdictions stop. Judge Dwyer, however, suggests
adding another step."° Individuals who are selected from the
master source list are sent a jury questionnaire that requests,
among other information, the race of the prospective juror. 2
Once these forms are completed, the judge would have the jury
commissioner randomly select, by computer, prospective jurors in
proportion to the percentage that each racial group bears to the
total population of the county." 3 Judge Dwyer's proposed plan
is a two-stage random selection process with intervention after
the first stage to ensure a racial balance on the jury according to
the demographic composition of the community.
A court in Sheridan County, Nebraska, where the source list
had been comprised only of registered voters, has also interfered
with the random selection process to increase the representa-
tiveness of jury pools.'" In one instance, the trial court heard
testimony from defense witnesses who visually observed the race
of jurors and reviewed the juror names.0 5 This evidence illus-
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Judge Dwyer's jurisdiction has not yet implemented the Judge's proposal.
502. Id. Furthermore, similar procedures are employed by Maricopa County,
Arizona and the Federal District Court system. Arizona's qualification form asks
prospective jurors to indicate their race to aid the court in monitoring compliance
with the fair cross-section requirement. The Federal District Court Juror Qualifica-
tion Form also asks potential jurors to specify their race to insure compliance with
the fair cross-section requirement. The federal form also notes that federal law re-
quires prospective jurors to indicate their race so that racial discrimination in the
juror selection process can be avoided.
503. Telephone Interview with Judge Dwyer, cited at note 496.
504. GINGER, cited at note 432, at 303.
505. Id. at 304. It is also interesting to note that the state, in voir dire, pro-
vided proof that Native Americans were a cognizable class by asking questions such
as, " '[d]o Indians in Sheridan County tend to stick together and do whites in
Sheridan County tend to stick with whites?' " Id. at 303. The two defense witnesses,
Charles Plantz and David Clegg testified as follows:
Charles Plantz, a local attorney, testified that he had seen most of the jury
panels from which juries had been selected in Sheridan County over the past
seven years, that this was around 1600 people, that he would have noticed
any Indian people on such panels since it was so unusual to see them there,
and that he remembered only five or six Indian people on the panels. He also
testified that he had received the key number list of 2137 jurors whose names
had been selected for possible service over the past five years by the Clerk,
that he would recognize the names of any Indian people on the list from his
knowledge of the community (based on his lifelong residence and his law prac-
tice), and that he recognized 20 such names. He had reviewed the Clerk's list
of 987 jurors who had actually appeared in court for services on juries over
the past five years, and he recognized four or five Indian people on that list.
David Clegg testified that he had seen four jury panels in Sheridan
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trated that one percent or fewer Native Americans were on jury
panels in a community where four to six percent of the popula-
tion was Native American. 506
Defense counsel in this case presented a motion to supplement
the venire with additional Native American names.0 7 The trial
judge instructed the clerk to supplement the venire as request-
ed."os The clerk procured a supplemental list of names of sixty-
five Native Americans, after inspecting names and addresses
from the County Department of Public Welfare, school census
records, and tribal rolls. 9 The district court judge then deter-
mined that six Native Americans should be added to the venire,
so that the percentage of Native Americans on the venire would
correlate to the percentage of Native Americans in the communi-
ty.
510
EFFORTS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN ERIE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Erie County utilizes multiple source lists derived from the lists
of registered voters and licensed drivers. These lists are updated
annually. In addition, anyone can volunteer to be added to the
list of potential jurors. When an individual volunteers for jury
service, after verification, that person's name is inserted in the
master list in the spaces where duplicate names have been delet-
ed.
There have been efforts in Erie County to obtain minority
volunteers for jury duty; however, these efforts have been
unsuccessful."1 ' Because no minorities came forward to volun-
County over the past two years, that this was 200 to 250 people, and that he
had never seen an Indian person on the panels. He also testified that he
reviewed the lists of prospective jurors for those panels (300 or more people).
In his experience, 90 percent or so of the Indian people in the area have
names that are recognizably Indian (either names like "Long Soldier" or
names of French origin that are known as "Indian" names, like "Janis"). There
were no names he recognized as Indian.
Id. at 304.
506. Id. at 304.
507. Id. at 305.
508. Id. at 305-06.
509. GINGER, cited at note 432, at 306. The clerk determined that the names
were Native-American by the spelling and pronunciation. Id.
510. Id. Expert testimony indicated that Native Americans constituted between
four and six percent of the population. Id.
511. Letter from Bobby Harrison, Executive Director of the John F. Kennedy
Center, Inc., in Erie to the Honorable George Levin of the Erie County Court of
Common Pleas (January 15, 1992). Mr. Harrison wrote:
I concur with your disappointment over the lack of response from the minority
community. We were most certainly invited to submit names of minorities to
supplement current jury selection lists.
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teer, it became obvious that new efforts to increase diversity in
the master source list were necessary. One solution was to have
church leaders submit the names and addresses of their entire
adult congregation for the master list."2 The letters resulted in
submission of names by only two church leaders."'3 The total
number of names submitted was two hundred forty-six.
5 14
Surprisingly, this list of minority parishioners did have a sig-
nificant effect on minority participation on the master jury source
list. One might think that church members would also be regis-
tered voters and, therefore, the court's efforts would merely du-
plicate the names already on the master juror list. But, when the
names and addresses of parishioners were compared with the
names on the master source list, the results were startling. Of
the two hundred fifty-one parishioners, only seventy-three were
on the voter registration list. The use of the parishioner lists,
therefore, substantially increased minority participation in the
jury process in Erie County.
I personally introduced the topic to twenty minority individu-
als who were participating in a leadership training course for the
United Way, entitled "Project Blueprint". One item which was
discussed was the court's efforts to have church leaders submit
names of parishioners. Surprisingly, participants in the training
course believed that because some church ministers, engaged in
factional religious conflicts or disputes among themselves, team-
building among these ministers could not be expected to achieve
the court's goal of including additional minority citizens on the
source list. They were not astonished to hear that only two min-
supplement current jury selection lists.
UBASOE (United Brothers and Sisters of Erie) did circulate and re-circulate
the enclosed juror sign-up sheet among the local minority community. Howev-
er, the response has been nil ....
... Erie's minority community needs to understand the importance of assum-
ing personal responsibility of the lack of black jurors. The local minority com-
munity needs to act, not react!
Id.
512. Letters from the Honorable Roger M. Fischer of the Court of Common
Pleas of Erie County to 33 local community pastors and elders whom Judge Fischer
believed were leaders in churches predominately attended by minorities (June 12,
1992) [hereinafter June 12 Letter from the Honorable Roger M. Fischer).
Judge Fischer assured these community leaders that submission of names
would increase minority representation on Erie County juries. Id. Judge Fischer also
reduced any uneasiness about the submission of names without the permission of
the congregants by stressing in his letters the importance of jury service and by
stating that "all citizens are obligated to participate." Id.
513. June 12 Letter from the Honorable Roger M. Fischer, cited at note 512.
514. Id. Several names were submitted to supplement this list to bring the
number of names to a grand total of 251. Id.
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isters had responded to the request for parishioners' names.
Project Blueprint leaders suggested that the court approach non-
religious leaders including people like themselves to obtain
names of volunteers from the community.
Seeking access to broader lists to be added to the master juror
list, this author personally contacted Attorney Jean Graybill,
counsel from the Department of Public Welfare in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, in March of 1993 and again in October of 1994.
The Department's difficulties in releasing information about its
clients were discussed. Ms. Graybill indicated that the lists of
welfare recipients are confidential pursuant to federal and state
law, which restrict the release of recipient information to very
limited purposes that do not include master juror lists. 5 ' The
confidentiality of welfare recipients is intended to protect the
privacy of welfare recipients. There is a concern that the lack of
confidentiality of assistance records could have a chilling effect
on applicants or potential applicants who may be entitled to
benefits such as monetary and medical assistance, and food
stamps. 16
Housing authority lists may be another source of additional
names. In the city of Erie, according to the controller for the Erie
Housing Authority, forty-nine percent of the households are Cau-
casian, forty-one percent are African-American and ten percent
are Hispanic.517 This author is not aware of a jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania that has utilized housing authority lists and a
concern arises as to whether access to these lists is statutorily
permissible.
Court access to lists of high school graduates, however, is not
prohibited.518 Because a large city school district could include
the most concentrated minority population in the community,
future use of lists of high school graduates could be an effective
way to increase minority participation in the jury source list.
515. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(eX8) (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(9), 1396a(a)(7) (1982);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62 §404 (1968 & Supp. 1994).
516. It is the Department's position that the Commonwealth Court, and not the
Court of Common Pleas has sole jurisdiction to order the release of any records that
are confidential under state law. Interview with Jean Graybill, Counsel for the De-
partment of Public Welfare, October, 1994. According to Ms. Graybill, a jury commis-
sion which did not use school census lists, the telephone book, and other lists that
were not confidential, would bear a heavy burden in demonstrating the necessity of
using confidential public assistance lists. Id.
517. Interview with Charles J. Lepo, the Controller for the Erie Housing Au-
thority (September 13, 1994). These statistics were valid as of December, 1993.
518. Letter from the Honorable Roger M. Fischer of the Erie County Court of
Common Pleas to the author (December 22, 1992) and Interview with Donald
Wright, Solicitor for the Erie County School District (August, 1994).
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Pennsylvania neither prohibits nor authorizes inquiry into the
racial identity of its prospective jurors. New York shares the
same frustration over the absence of legislation permitting or
prohibiting inquiries into the race of a juror.5"9 Data on jurors'
race, however, is vital if courts are to monitor the representa-
tiveness of juror pools and to modify any identifiable weaknesses.
Unless the court can identify jurors by race, "the court system is
marred by inequality which it may be powerless to remedy under
existing policies.""'0
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Resistance to change is built into the court system through the
concept of stare decisis. Case law precedents create consistency,
reflect fairness and demonstate "our commitment to equality, our
respect for the individual, and our belief in personal free-
dom."52' We are indeed a "tradition-bound" judicial system.522
Although the system is rooted in fundamental traditional princi-
ples of fairness, however, the demographics of society have
changed dramatically. Because our judicial system depends on
the public's confidence and because society will continue to expe-
rience change, our judicial system must also change. Our goal is
to place more minority jurors in jury pools, and a demographic
approach accomplishes this goal. It incorporates an objective
standard rather than a judge's or a jury commissioner's subjec-
tive standard to increase minority participation in the jury pool.
This concept will meet resistance because it means change.
The paradigm of random selection can only be effectively changed
through the court's leadership, direction, and involvement. Oppo-
nents of change will continue to point to the constitutionality of
the current system of random selection. However, the Constitu-
tion provides only a starting point for rights and opportunities for
fairness and justice. The Constitution does not prohibit or limit
the courts from assuming the burden of improving the jury pro-
cess.
The courts should also place reasonable limitations upon valid
juror excuses. A balanced jury pool is diminished when jurors are
excused without appearing before the court to explain their diffi-
culty in serving as a juror. Thus, before a juror is excused, the
519. Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, cited at
note 482, at 233.
520. Id. at 234.
521. Ira Pilchen, American Judicature Society Conference Summary, The Future
and the Courts of Illinois 3 (1992) (on file with the author).
522. Pilchen, cited at note 521, at 2.
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court must emphasize to that juror the importance of all citizens
participating in the jury process. If the court or jury commission-
er finds this instruction too administratively burdensome, a video
with a judge and potential juror requesting to be excused could
suffice to inform the juror of the importance of service.
Resolving the community's perception of minority
representativeness will be healthy for the democratic principle
embodied in the modem American concept of juries - impartiali-
ty. By addressing and resolving public perceptions, we can reach
the laudable goal of proving that the judicial system and the jury
process are both color-blind and color-conscious.

